Alberti v. Bouse, 29 N.Y.2d 437 (1972): Defining ‘Directing’ Under New York Labor Law §240

Alberti v. Bouse, 29 N.Y.2d 437 (1972)

For a general contractor to be liable under New York Labor Law §240 for injuries to a subcontractor’s employee, the contractor must have ‘directed’ the employee’s work, meaning there must be supervision of the manner and method of the work, not merely granting permission to use equipment.

Summary

Alberti, an employee of a painting subcontractor, was injured when he fell from scaffolding while working at a St. Lawrence University auditorium. He sued the general contractor, Bouse, claiming violations of Labor Law §240. Bouse had allowed the subcontractor to use scaffolding parts from its own supply. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that Bouse did not ‘direct’ Alberti’s work. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that merely granting permission to use equipment does not constitute ‘directing’ within the meaning of Labor Law §240, which requires supervision of the manner and method of the work.

Facts

Alberti was employed by Svendsen Decorators, Inc., a subcontractor for John W. Bouse Construction Corp., the general contractor.
Alberti was injured in a fall from a scaffold while painting the ceiling of an auditorium.
Svendsen’s own scaffolding was not high enough to reach the ceiling.
Svendsen asked Bouse’s superintendent for permission to use some of Bouse’s tubular scaffolding parts.
Bouse’s superintendent granted permission, stating Svendsen could use the scaffolding.
There was no agreement for Bouse to supply the scaffolding nor any direction from Bouse on how to use it. It was simply permission.

Procedural History

Alberti sued Bouse, alleging common-law negligence and absolute liability under Labor Law §240.
Alberti elected to proceed solely on the theory of absolute liability under Labor Law §240, dismissing the common-law negligence claim.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, relying on Galbraith v. Pike & Son, finding no supervision, control, or contractual obligation by Bouse to provide scaffolding.
The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether, under Labor Law §240, a general contractor ‘directs’ the labor of a subcontractor’s employee when it grants permission to use its scaffolding, such that the general contractor can be held liable for injuries sustained by the employee due to defective scaffolding.

Holding

No, because ‘directing,’ as used in Labor Law §240, means supervision of the manner and method of the work to be performed, and the mere granting of permission to use scaffolding does not constitute such direction.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s dismissal, emphasizing the strict and literal construction of the word ‘directing’ in Labor Law §240.
The court distinguished between ‘permission’ and ‘direction,’ stating that a mere grant of permission or a favor done for the plaintiff’s convenience does not satisfy the affirmative ‘directing’ required by the statute. The Court stated, “‘Directing’…means just that; for one person to be “directed” by another, there must be supervision of the manner and method of the work to be performed. The words are to be construed strictly and literally.”
The court cited Glass v. Gens-Jarboe, Inc. (306 N. Y. 786) as an analogous case where a painter, employed by a subcontractor, was injured by a defective plank he was permitted to use from the general contractor’s supply. The Court in Glass held that the case did not fall under §240 because there was only permission, not direction.
The court also referenced Mendes v. Caristo Constr. Corp. (6 Y 2d 729) where a subcontractor was allowed to use the general contractor’s rope sling. The court held that such permissive language did not amount to direction under the Labor Law.
The court also noted that even if Bouse had ‘directed’ Alberti, Alberti still needed to prove that the defect in the scaffolding was the proximate cause of his injuries. “Violation of the statute alone is not enough; plaintiff was obligated to show that the violation was a contributing cause of his fall and there was no proof of that essential element here.”