People v. Simmons, 32 N.Y.2d 259 (1973)
When a statute provides a rebuttable presumption, the jury must be instructed that the presumption is not conclusive and can be overcome by evidence presented by the defendant.
Summary
Two brothers were convicted of unauthorized use of a vehicle. At trial, they admitted to using the car but claimed they believed they had the owner’s permission. The trial court instructed the jury on the statutory presumption that a person using a vehicle without the owner’s consent knows they lack such consent, but failed to explain that this presumption was rebuttable. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the jury instructions were incomplete and misleading because they did not inform the jury that the presumption could be rebutted by the defendants’ evidence. Because the defendants had completed their sentences, the charges were dismissed.
Facts
Two brothers, aged 16 and 18, were arrested and charged with unauthorized use of a vehicle. They admitted to using the car but claimed a neighborhood boy told them the car was his and gave them permission to “try it out.” They conceded the car was stolen and they lacked the true owner’s permission. The father of the defendants testified that the neighborhood boy offered to sell him the car the previous evening.
Procedural History
The defendants were convicted at trial. The District Attorney conceded error in the jury charge both at the appellate term and before the Court of Appeals, but the appellate term affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate term’s decision.
Issue(s)
Whether a jury instruction is fatally defective when it explains a statutory presumption of knowledge but fails to inform the jury that the presumption is rebuttable by the defendant’s evidence.
Holding
Yes, because the failure to inform the jury that the presumption was rebuttable was a fatal defect mandating reversal of the conviction.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s instruction on the statutory presumption, without explaining that it was rebuttable, was incomplete and misleading. The statute (Penal Law § 165.05(1)) states that “A person who engages in any such conduct without the consent of the owner is presumed to know that he does not have such consent.” While this gives the People the initial benefit of a presumption, it is a rebuttable one as stated in People v. McCaleb, 25 N.Y.2d 394. The court cited Richardson, Evidence [9th ed.], § 57, p. 35, which stated: “when ‘the rebuttal evidence presents an issue of credibility, it is for the jury to determine whether the rebuttal evidence is to be believed and, consequently, for the jury to determine whether the presumption has been destroyed’.”
The court reasoned that failing to inform the jury that the presumption was rebuttable might lead them to believe it was a conclusive presumption. As McCormick observed, “The jury, unless a further explanation is made, may suppose that the presumption is a conclusive one, especially if the judge uses the expression, ‘the law presumes’.” (McCormick, Evidence § 317, p. 669).
The court emphasized that the only issue for the jury was whether the defendants used the car knowing they lacked the owner’s consent. The incomplete instruction on the presumption denied the jury a full and fair opportunity to consider the evidence relevant to the defendants’ guilt. Because the defendants had already completed their sentences, the court dismissed the charges, citing People v. Scala, 26 N.Y.2d 753 and People v. Kvalheim, 17 N.Y.2d 510.