People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254 (1973)
Evidence of a crime observed in plain view inside a vehicle, with the defendant’s consent, provides probable cause for a warrantless search and seizure of the vehicle incident to a lawful arrest.
Summary
Brosnan was convicted of larceny and assault after a brutal attack on a woman he met in a bar. Police, investigating the crime, found Brosnan and asked to see his truck. He voluntarily showed them the truck, and through the windows, they observed bloodstains, a woman’s shoe, and glasses. Brosnan was arrested and the truck was seized. A subsequent search revealed more evidence. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the initial observation of incriminating evidence in plain view justified the warrantless seizure and subsequent search of the vehicle incident to a lawful arrest. The court also addressed concerns about the prosecutor’s summation, ultimately deeming it not prejudicial enough to warrant a new trial given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
Facts
Margaret Sullivan met Brosnan at a bar and later left with him in his panel truck.
Sullivan was found unconscious and severely injured the next morning near a gas station. Her injuries included a fractured skull, lacerations, and bite marks.
Police learned of Brosnan’s association with Sullivan and went to his home.
Brosnan voluntarily led the police to his panel truck in a public garage.
Through the truck’s window, police saw bloodstains on the dashboard, a woman’s shoe, and a pair of glasses.
Procedural History
Brosnan was convicted of larceny and assault in a jury trial.
The Appellate Division modified the conviction, upholding only the assault conviction.
Two justices dissented, arguing that the prosecutor’s summation warranted a new trial.
The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the warrantless seizure and subsequent search of Brosnan’s panel truck violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Whether the prosecutor’s summation was so inflammatory as to require a new trial.
Holding
Yes, the warrantless search and seizure was permissible, because the police had observed incriminating evidence in plain view inside the truck with the defendant’s consent prior to the arrest, justifying the seizure as incident to a lawful arrest.
No, the prosecutor’s summation, while improper, did not warrant a new trial because it was not sufficiently prejudicial given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that the key factor was the police’s observation of incriminating evidence in plain view within the truck before any action was taken to seize it. Brosnan voluntarily showed the police the truck, and the bloodstains, shoe, and glasses were visible through the window. This established probable cause to believe the truck was the scene of the assault. The court emphasized, “Unlike the legion of automobile search and seizure cases which have occasioned interest and difficulty, in this case before the police took any action with respect to the panel truck, they had seen the incriminating evidence in the truck which identified it as the scene of the bloody assault and which linked the victim’s last-known companion, the defendant, to its perpetration.” The court distinguished this case from others where the search preceded the establishment of probable cause or where the evidence discovered was unrelated to the initial reason for the arrest. The seizure occurred when a police guard was placed on the truck, preventing its removal. The court cited Chambers v. Maroney, stating that there is no constitutional difference between seizing and holding a car before obtaining a warrant and conducting an immediate search without a warrant when probable cause exists. The court dismissed the claim that a delayed search was impermissible. It found that the later examination of the truck at the site was merely a further examination of an object of evidence already lawfully seized. Regarding the prosecutor’s summation, the court acknowledged it was improper, using inflammatory language and epithets. However, it held that the impropriety was not significant enough to influence the jury, given the overwhelming evidence. The court stated, “The rule is that an improper summation, at least when the objectionable parts consist largely of abusive and intemperate language as here, should be assessed for its prejudicial effect, and it requires greater impropriety to produce that effect in a stronger case.”