People v. Michael, 30 N.Y.2d 376 (1972)
A defendant may be retried without violating double jeopardy protections when the defendant’s own actions caused the mistrial, creating a ‘manifest necessity’ to halt the initial proceeding.
Summary
This case addresses the issue of double jeopardy when a mistrial is declared due to the unavailability of witnesses, where the unavailability is attributed to threats made by the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals held that retrial was permissible because the defendant’s actions in threatening witnesses contributed to the mistrial, thus establishing a “manifest necessity” to abort the first trial. Allowing retrial in such circumstances does not violate double jeopardy principles, as the defendant should not benefit from obstructing the judicial process.
Facts
During jury selection in the initial trial, the prosecutor discovered that two witnesses were difficult to locate. Following a holiday adjournment, the prosecutor informed the court that the missing witnesses had been threatened and that their disappearance was attributable to the defendant. At the subsequent trial, one witness testified to leaving the state because his life was threatened, and another testified that the defendant’s uncle and another person threatened her with a knife.
Procedural History
The trial court granted the People’s application for a mistrial on November 28, 1967, after the jury had been sworn but before any witnesses were called. The defendant was then retried. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine whether the retrial violated the defendant’s protection against double jeopardy.
Issue(s)
Whether the mistrial granted on the People’s application due to witness unavailability, where the unavailability was allegedly caused by the defendant, precludes a subsequent trial based on double jeopardy grounds.
Holding
No, because the defendant’s own actions in threatening witnesses contributed to the mistrial, thus establishing a “manifest necessity” to abort the first trial.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that if a defendant’s actions cause a trial to be aborted, they should not be allowed to claim double jeopardy as a constitutional safeguard. This situation falls within the scope of “manifest necessity,” which justifies interrupting a trial. The court distinguished this case from Downum v. United States, where the witness absence was due to the prosecutor’s failure to ensure their presence. Here, the defendant’s alleged intimidation of witnesses directly impeded the prosecution’s ability to present its case.
The court emphasized that a defendant should not benefit from frustrating the trial process. Citing United States v. Perez, the court reiterated that “manifest necessity” allows for the interruption of a trial. The court held that the retrial was permissible under the precedent established in Matter of Bland v. Supreme Ct., County of N.Y., indicating that actions taken by the defendant to disrupt the trial can waive double jeopardy protections.
The court stated, “If the act of a defendant himself aborts a trial, he ought not readily be heard to say that by frustrating the trial he had succeeded in erecting a constitutional shelter based on double jeopardy.”