In the Matter of the Application of David B. Coston, as County Clerk of New York County, for a Judgment Declaring Whether the City of New York or the State of New York is Entitled to Receive Fines Imposed in Certain Criminal Contempt Proceedings., 29 N.Y.2d 124 (1971)
Fines imposed for criminal contempt of court are payable to the treasurer of the county in which the court imposing them is sitting, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 791.
Summary
This case concerns the disposition of fines levied against public employee unions for criminal contempt for violating the Taylor Law, which prohibits strikes by public employees. The County Clerk of New York County brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the City of New York or the State of New York was entitled to receive the fines. The New York Court of Appeals held that, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 791, the fines were payable to the treasurer of the county in which the court imposing the fines was sitting, which in this case was the City of New York’s finance administrator.
Facts
Three New York City unions, representing sanitation workers, teachers, and supervisory school personnel, were found guilty of criminal contempt for violating the Taylor Law by striking. The Supreme Court, New York County, fined the unions, resulting in a total of nearly $500,000. The County Clerk held these funds, and both the City and State claimed entitlement to them, leading to the declaratory judgment action.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court, New York County, granted summary judgment in favor of the City of New York, concluding that the City was entitled to the funds. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the judgment. The New York Court of Appeals granted the State leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether fines imposed for criminal contempt of court for violating the Taylor Law are payable to the State of New York or to the county in which the court imposing the fines is sitting, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 791.
Holding
No, because under Judiciary Law § 791, fines for criminal contempt are payable to the treasurer of the county in which the court imposing them is sitting.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on Judiciary Law § 791, which governs the disposition of fines when no special provision has been made. This section directs the clerk of the court to issue a warrant to the sheriff, commanding them to collect the fine and pay it to the county treasurer. The court emphasized the criminal nature of contempt proceedings, stating that a fine for criminal contempt is a “punishment for the wrong in the interest of public justice, and not in the interest of an individual litigant.” The court reasoned that, similar to other criminal offenses where fines are payable to local subdivisions or county treasurers, fines for criminal contempt should be paid to the treasurer of the county where the court is located. The court rejected the State’s argument that § 791 only describes the procedure for collecting fines and does not address title, stating that statutes rarely specify which governmental body receives title when directing payment to a county or city treasurer. The court also dismissed the State’s reliance on the Finance Law, noting that those provisions only apply after it has been established that the fines belong to the State, which was not the case here. The court found that the City, through its finance administrator, was the proper recipient of the fines.