In re Ronald B., 29 N.Y.2d 730 (1971)

A single, isolated incident of misconduct, even if it constitutes a crime if committed by an adult, is insufficient to support a determination that a minor is a “person in need of supervision” (PINS) under New York Family Court Act.

Summary

This case addresses whether a single act of criminal trespass is sufficient to classify a 13-year-old as a “person in need of supervision” (PINS). The New York Court of Appeals held that it is not. The court emphasized that a PINS designation requires more than an isolated incident to justify state intervention. The court also clarified the permissible scope of findings on lesser included offenses when the primary charge is dismissed. This decision underscores the need for evidence of a pattern of misbehavior to support a PINS adjudication and protects against overreach based on isolated youthful indiscretions.

Facts

A petition was filed against Ronald B., a 13-year-old, alleging acts that, if committed by an adult, could constitute criminal trespass in the second degree and burglary in the third degree. The petition sought to have Ronald B. declared a juvenile delinquent or a person in need of supervision based on these alleged actions. The only specific misbehavior alleged was a single instance of criminal trespass.

Procedural History

The Family Court dismissed the charge of third-degree burglary at the close of the petitioner’s case. Despite dismissing the burglary charge, the Family Court found Ronald B. to be a “person in need of supervision” based on the evidence presented. Ronald B. appealed this determination, arguing that a single act of criminal trespass was insufficient to support the PINS designation. The appellate division affirmed the Family Court decision, and Ronald B. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a single instance of criminal trespass is sufficient to support a finding that a minor is a “person in need of supervision” under the New York Family Court Act.
2. Whether the Family Court retains jurisdiction to find a juvenile delinquent on a lesser-included offense when the primary charged offense is dismissed.

Holding

1. No, because a PINS determination requires evidence of more than a single, isolated incident of misbehavior. The record must demonstrate a pattern or ongoing behavior that warrants state intervention.
2. No, because when the Family Court dismissed the burglary charge, the court was thereafter without jurisdiction to find any lesser crime included within the dismissed burglary charge.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reversed the Family Court’s order, holding that the petition and the evidence presented at the hearing did not support the finding that Ronald B. was a “person in need of supervision.” The court relied on its prior decision in Matter of David W., 28 N.Y.2d 589, emphasizing that “there must be more than a single isolated incident to support the determination of ‘need of supervision’.” The court reasoned that Article 7 of the Family Court Act does not provide for intervention based on a single illegal act unless that act would constitute a misdemeanor or felony if committed by an adult.

The court further explained that while the facts alleged might have supported a charge of juvenile delinquency based on criminal trespass in the second degree (if properly alleged), the petition only presented this as a lesser included offense of the dismissed burglary charge. Once the burglary charge was dismissed, the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to find Ronald B. guilty of any lesser crime included within it.

The court acknowledged that the Family Court could find a respondent had committed a lesser included crime and determine them to be a juvenile delinquent based on that crime, but it emphasized that in this instance, the procedural posture (dismissal of the primary charge) precluded that finding. This case is significant because it clarifies the limits of PINS designations and emphasizes the need for evidence of ongoing misbehavior rather than single incidents. It also reinforces the principle that jurisdiction over lesser-included offenses is contingent on the viability of the primary charge.