People v. Lasky, 31 N.Y.2d 146 (1972)
When a defendant challenges a prior conviction used for sentencing enhancement, the burden of proving the prior conviction’s unconstitutionality rests on the defendant, especially when the record indicates representation by counsel.
Summary
Lasky was convicted of multiple crimes and sentenced as a fourth-felony offender based on prior convictions, including one in Arkansas. Lasky challenged his sentence, arguing that the Arkansas conviction was invalid because he was not represented by counsel. The New York Court of Appeals held that Lasky had the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of the Arkansas conviction and failed to meet that burden because the Arkansas court record indicated he was represented by counsel, and Lasky admitted to discussing his plea with someone from the court.
Facts
Lasky was convicted of conspiracy, burglary, and grand larceny in New York in 1966. Based on prior felony convictions, the District Attorney sought to have Lasky sentenced as a fourth-felony offender. One of the prior convictions was from Arkansas in 1960. Lasky claimed he was not represented by counsel in the Arkansas case, rendering that conviction unconstitutional and unusable for sentencing enhancement.
Procedural History
The Dutchess County Court initially found that Lasky failed to prove he lacked counsel in the Arkansas conviction and sentenced him as a fourth-felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed. Lasky’s petition for resentencing was denied, and the Appellate Division affirmed, treating the petition as a motion for a writ of error coram nobis. Lasky filed another petition for a writ of error coram nobis with the Dutchess County Court, which was denied without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. This appeal followed.
Issue(s)
Whether the burden of proof was correctly placed on the defendant to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of a prior conviction when challenging a fourth-felony offender sentencing.
Holding
Yes, because when challenging a prior conviction used for sentencing enhancement, the defendant bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality, especially when the record suggests representation by counsel.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that Lasky failed to prove his Arkansas conviction was unconstitutional. While Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), prohibits presuming waiver of counsel from a silent record, the Arkansas record here was not silent; it stated that “Harry Robinson [was] appointed to defend.” A Federal District Court also reviewed the Arkansas conviction and found Lasky’s challenge “lacking in any merit.” The court noted Lasky’s admission that he spoke with someone from the court who instructed him to plead guilty. The court emphasized that the defendant had the burden to show good cause for failing to challenge the prior conviction at sentencing and must carry the burden of proof as to the unconstitutionality of any prior conviction.
The court distinguished the case from situations where the record is silent regarding counsel. Here, the Arkansas docket specifically stated, “Davis and [Lasky] — Plea of not Guilty — Harry Robinson appointed to defend.” This notation, combined with Lasky’s admission of discussing his plea, outweighed the formalistic recitation of “in proper person” on the certified judgment. The court concluded that Lasky failed to carry his burden of proof.
The court also addressed the argument that CPL 400.20 (subds. 5, 6) placed the burden on the People to prove persistent felony offender status. However, this statute, effective September 1, 1967, was not retroactive and did not apply to Lasky’s post-conviction motion.