People v. Rivera, 27 N.Y.2d 286 (1970)
A defendant seeking to vacate a conviction via coram nobis based on a tainted pretrial identification procedure must demonstrate that the opportunity to assert the due process violation was substantially impaired or denied at the time of the original trial.
Summary
Rivera sought to vacate his 1963 conviction through coram nobis, arguing that the pretrial identification procedure tainted his subsequent in-court identification, violating his due process rights. He argued that he should have been afforded a hearing on the issue of taint, even though his trial predated People v. Ballott. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of coram nobis, holding that while the pretrial identification procedure was improper, Rivera failed to demonstrate that his due process rights could not have been vindicated under the law existing at the time of his trial. The court emphasized that coram nobis requires a showing that the opportunity to assert a fundamental constitutional right was substantially impaired or denied.
Facts
Rivera was convicted in 1963. He later sought to vacate the conviction via coram nobis, alleging that the pretrial identification procedure was “unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification,” thereby tainting the in-court identification. The facts supporting this claim of a suggestive pretrial identification procedure were uncontested by the prosecution.
Procedural History
The defendant was originally convicted in 1963. He then filed a coram nobis proceeding to vacate that conviction. The coram nobis court denied the writ without a hearing. This denial was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a defendant can successfully challenge a conviction via coram nobis based on a pretrial identification procedure that allegedly tainted a subsequent in-court identification, when the trial predated the establishment of a specific procedural remedy (a preliminary hearing on the issue of taint), if the defendant had other avenues to challenge the identification procedure at the time of trial?
Holding
No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that his due process rights related to the allegedly tainted identification could not have been vindicated under the law existing at the time of his original trial.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that while United States v. Wade and its progeny established stricter standards for pretrial identification procedures and provided for preliminary hearings to determine taint, these standards are not automatically applicable retroactively via coram nobis. The court acknowledged that in direct appeals, it had required that the issue of taint be resolved at a separate hearing outside the presence of the jury. However, the court emphasized that this procedure is not constitutionally required and that coram nobis requires a showing that the opportunity to assert a fundamental constitutional right was substantially impaired or denied. The court stated, “coram nobis requires, in addition to the assertion of a fundamental constitutional right, that the opportunity to assert the same has been substantially impaired or denied”.
The court noted that Rivera could have challenged the identification procedure at trial, even without the benefit of a formal Wade hearing. He could have excepted to the identification and developed its alleged suggestiveness off the record. His decision to forego these routes suggested a trial strategy. Therefore, the court concluded that the alleged due process violation could have been vindicated under the law as it existed prior to the decision in Ballott. Absent such a showing that the claimed due process violation could not have been vindicated under the law as it existed prior to Ballott, the conviction cannot be disturbed.
The court distinguished between direct appeals and collateral attacks via coram nobis, emphasizing the intrinsic limitations of the writ itself. The court implicitly balances the need to correct potential injustices against the need for finality in judgments, particularly where the defendant had opportunities to raise the issue at trial.