Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221 (1971)
A zoning ordinance requiring larger minimum lot sizes is constitutional if it addresses a legitimate public concern, such as preventing water pollution, and if the property owner fails to demonstrate that the ordinance deprives them of any reasonable use of their property.
Summary
Salamar Builders Corp. challenged a zoning ordinance amendment that increased the minimum lot size from one acre to 1.5 acres, arguing it rendered their property unmarketable. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding that the increased lot size requirement was a valid exercise of the town’s police power due to legitimate concerns about water pollution from septic tanks in the area. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to prove the ordinance deprived them of any reasonable use of the property, as their evidence of economic hardship was insufficient to demonstrate confiscation.
Facts
Salamar Builders Corp. acquired 70 acres of land in the Town of Southeast, which was initially zoned R-2, requiring 40,000 square foot lots. The company prepared a subdivision map for 44 lots. The town board then amended the zoning ordinance, upzoning the area to R-1, requiring 60,000 square foot lots. Salamar claimed the new ordinance made their property unmarketable because the increased lot size made building economically unfeasible for the type of homes typically sold in the area.
Procedural History
Salamar sued to declare the zoning ordinance unconstitutional. The trial court found the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to Salamar’s property. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and remitted the case to the Special Term for entry of a judgment declaring the zoning ordinance constitutional as applied to the plaintiff’s property.
Issue(s)
Whether a zoning ordinance requiring larger minimum lot sizes is unconstitutional when it is alleged to have a significant negative economic impact on a property owner.
Holding
No, because the town demonstrated a legitimate public purpose (preventing water pollution) for the upzoning, and the property owner failed to demonstrate that the ordinance deprived them of any reasonable use of their property.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that while zoning regulations must reasonably relate to promoting public health, safety, and welfare, they are a valid exercise of police power. “The ordinance * * * must find [its] justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare”. In this case, the prospect of water pollution from septic tanks due to the area’s topography provided a valid reason for the upzoning. The court emphasized that the ordinance was designed to reduce the number of septic tanks and allow sufficient land area to prevent effluent from seeping into water sources, thus minimizing the danger of pollution. The court applied the rule from Matter of Fulling v. Palumbo, stating that when a property owner suffers significant economic injury from an area standard ordinance, the municipality must affirmatively show that public health, safety, and welfare are served by upholding the standard. However, the property owner must further establish that the hardship deprives them of any reasonable use of the property or destroys the greater part of its value. The court found Salamar failed to demonstrate the ordinance was tantamount to confiscation. The evidence did not support Salamar’s conclusion that they could build and sell houses on one-acre parcels without a loss but would suffer a loss under the increased requirements. The court found that, based on Salamar’s own experts, Salamar would incur a loss regardless of the zoning regulation. The court concluded that while Salamar demonstrated some financial loss, it did not rise to the level of depriving them of “any use of the property to which it is reasonably adapted.”