People v. Caserta, 19 N.Y.2d 18 (1966)
A witness may not testify to an extrajudicial identification of a composite sketch of the defendant; however, the sketch can be used in suppression hearings regarding probable cause or during cross-examination to highlight inconsistencies in identification.
Summary
Caserta was convicted of robbery, and the prosecution presented testimony from an identifying witness who had worked with a police artist to create a composite sketch of the suspect four days after the crime. The admission of the composite sketch and testimony about its creation was challenged on appeal. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the introduction of the composite sketch through the identifying witness was prejudicial error. The court reasoned that it violated the established rule against bolstering a witness’s identification with prior consistent statements or extrajudicial identifications of photographs. The court also found that the prosecutor’s prejudicial misstatements during summation warranted a new trial.
Facts
The defendant, Caserta, was accused of robbery.
An identifying witness testified at trial.
Four days after the robbery, the witness collaborated with a police artist to create a composite sketch of the suspect.
Over the defense’s objection, the trial court admitted the composite sketch into evidence, and the witness testified about creating it.
During summation, the prosecutor made statements implying the defendant altered his appearance after the robbery.
Procedural History
The defendant was convicted of robbery in the trial court.
The defendant appealed the conviction, arguing that the admission of the composite sketch and the prosecutor’s statements were errors.
The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case.
Issue(s)
Whether the admission of the composite sketch and testimony regarding its creation constituted reversible error.
Whether the prosecutor’s prejudicial misstatements during summation warranted a new trial.
Holding
Yes, because a witness cannot testify about an extrajudicial identification of a composite sketch, similar to the rule against extrajudicial photo identifications, and the sketch’s admission was prejudicial, given that identification was key to the case.
Yes, because the prosecutor’s statements were not supported by evidence and demonstrably influenced the jury, and the court failed to cure the prejudice.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that allowing the identifying witness to testify about the composite sketch and admitting the sketch itself was similar to allowing testimony about extrajudicial photo identifications, which is prohibited under New York law because it improperly bolsters the witness’s testimony. The court stated, “The rule is settled in this State that a witness may not testify to an extrajudicial identification of a photograph of the defendant.” The court extended this rule to composite sketches, stating, “The reason for that rule applies with greater force in the case of a composite sketch.” The court acknowledged that other jurisdictions have varying rules on the admissibility of composite sketches but adhered to the established New York precedent. The court clarified that composite sketches could be used in suppression hearings to establish probable cause or during cross-examination to highlight inconsistencies.
The court also addressed the prosecutor’s statements during summation, finding them to be prejudicial because they implied that the defendant had altered his appearance to avoid identification and that the statements were unsupported by evidence. The court noted the jury’s interest in the alleged alteration, demonstrated by their request for a magnifying glass, indicating the prosecutor’s statements influenced their deliberations. The court stated that the trial court erred by not allowing the defendant to rebut the prosecutor’s statements or instructing the jury to disregard them, citing precedent such as People v. Fleischman, 10 N.Y.2d 1025 (1961).