Doherty v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Village of Sea Cliff, 28 N.Y.2d 304 (1971)
A zoning board is not required to grant a variance based solely on economic loss when the hardship was self-created by the property owner after the enactment of the zoning ordinance.
Summary
Doherty sought a variance to build on a substandard lot he acquired after a zoning ordinance was in place. The ordinance required 100 feet of frontage, while Doherty’s lot had only 42.40 feet, though it exceeded the square footage requirement. The Board of Zoning Appeals denied the variance, but the lower court annulled that decision, citing economic hardship. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the board was not required to grant a variance based on economic loss alone, especially when the hardship was self-created by purchasing the lot after the zoning ordinance was in effect. The court emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the party seeking the variance.
Facts
Doherty purchased a substandard lot in a Residence B zone in the Village of Sea Cliff in 1965. The lot had only 42.40 feet of frontage, well below the 100-foot minimum required by the village’s 1960 zoning ordinance. The lot size exceeded the square footage requirement. The prior owner, Dobsovitz, owned the larger lot when the ordinance was adopted in 1960 but created the substandard lot by deed in 1965.
Procedural History
Doherty applied for a variance, which was denied by the Board of Zoning Appeals. The Special Term annulled the board’s determination. The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term’s decision, with a dissenting opinion. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether a zoning board is required to grant a variance when the property owner demonstrates economic injury if the variance is not granted, even if the nonconformity was self-created after the enactment of the zoning ordinance.
Holding
No, because the economic loss claimed is not controlling when the hardship was self-created. The board is not required to grant the variance on such a showing, and its failure to do so is neither arbitrary nor unlawful.
Court’s Reasoning
The court distinguished its earlier decision in Matter of Fulling v. Palumbo, clarifying that Fulling does not mandate variances in all financial loss cases, particularly when the hardship is self-created. The court cited Contino v. Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead and Matter of 113 Hillside Ave. Corp. v. Zaino, which emphasized that self-created hardships do not automatically entitle an owner to a variance. The court noted the land had adequate area, but was well under the minimum front footage and was also formerly part of a larger single residential plat. The court referenced Matter of Weinstein v. Planning Bd. of Vil. of Great Neck (21 Y 2d 1001) as precedent. The court also pointed out that the petitioner did not clearly show what he paid for the parcel. The court stated that requiring the board to prove that public health, safety, and welfare would be adversely affected by granting the variance would impose an extremely heavy burden. The court reasoned: “If the general limitations on frontage and size of lots serve the public welfare and are good as a matter of law, the burden of showing the need for variance ought to be on him who seeks it. When the public authority shows the general validity of the ordinance, it ought not be required to show it again in each case in which variance is denied.” The court concluded that the board acted within its legal competence in refusing to grant the variance and that the petitioner had not demonstrated that the board’s determination was arbitrary.