Willis v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Amsterdam, 28 N.Y.2d 375 (1971)
When an organization invites children to participate in its programs for a fee, it owes a duty of care commensurate with the special responsibility it has assumed to inspect and guard against dangers of injury to those children.
Summary
A 13-year-old girl, Deborah Willis, was injured at an “indoor sleep-in” event organized by the Amsterdam YMCA when a plastic arm from a chair, dislodged by a counselor (Peggy Day) from a shelf while reaching for a pillow, fell and struck her. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that the infant plaintiff was free from contributory negligence and also addressed the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the defendants’ negligence. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s judgment, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to a charge of freedom from contributory negligence and that the YMCA’s duty of care to the children participating in its program required reasonable measures to prevent foreseeable injuries.
Facts
The Amsterdam YMCA organized an “indoor sleep-in” for young people for a fee. Deborah Willis, a 13-year-old, participated and was sleeping on the floor about a foot away from the wall. While Peggy Day, a counselor, was retrieving a pillow from a shelf above a built-in rack along the wall, she dislodged a plastic arm of a chair that had been placed under the pillow. The chair arm fell and injured Deborah.
Procedural History
The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss at the end of the plaintiffs’ case. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and judgment was entered accordingly. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the infant plaintiff was entitled to a jury instruction that she was free from contributory negligence under the given facts.
2. Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of negligence against the YMCA and the counselor.
Holding
1. Yes, because under the facts, the infant plaintiff was not required to exercise any care other than lying down to sleep. The evidence did not support a finding of contributory negligence.
2. Yes, because the YMCA owed a duty of care to the children participating in its program, commensurate with the special responsibility it had assumed, to inspect and guard against dangers of injury.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that contributory negligence should not be charged where there is no or insufficient evidence to support it. Here, the infant plaintiff’s actions of lying down to sleep did not constitute negligence. The Court emphasized the duty of care the YMCA owed to the children participating in its program, noting that the YMCA invited the children onto its premises for a fee, thus assuming a special responsibility for their safety. The Court stated that “in inviting, for a fee, young children to sleep on the floor of its premises, the YMCA owed a duty commensurate with the special responsibility it had assumed to its charges to inspect and guard against danger of injury.” The Court noted that the YMCA should have reasonably expected that care would be taken to ensure that loose objects heavy enough to inflict injury would not be left on the shelf where pillows were stored. The Court cited Oldham v. Hoover, 140 So. 2d 417, 421 (C.A., La., 1962), stating that persons having children entrusted to their care are “charged with the highest degree of care.” The Court found that the precise manner of the accident was not controlling on the question of negligence, and it was not necessary for the defendant to have foreseen the particular consequences of their act or omission, citing 65 C. J. S., Negligence, § 5, subd. [7], p. 528. The Court reversed the order and directed a new trial.