People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361 (1971)

In a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search, the defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving the illegality of the search, while the People have the initial burden of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct.

Summary

This case addresses whether the burden of proof in challenging the admissibility of evidence obtained during a warrantless search should shift from the defendant to the People (prosecution) due to concerns about potential police perjury. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant retains the ultimate burden of proving the illegality of the search. While the People must initially demonstrate the legality of the police conduct, the defendant must ultimately persuade the court that the search was unlawful. The court rejected the argument that the rise of “dropsy” cases after Mapp v. Ohio warranted a shift in the burden of proof, emphasizing the importance of judicial review and internal police procedures in addressing potential abuses.

Facts

The case involved five separate appeals where defendants were charged with possession of heroin. In each case, arresting officers testified that they observed the defendants drop glassine envelopes containing narcotics as the officers approached. The defendants challenged the admissibility of the evidence, alleging that the police testimony was fabricated to circumvent the warrant requirement.

Procedural History

The Criminal Court, Bronx County, convicted Berrios after rejecting his testimony that the officer searched him. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. In Brown, the Criminal Court suppressed the evidence, but the Appellate Term reversed. In Ortiz and Tate, the Criminal Court granted the motions to suppress, which were subsequently reversed by the Appellate Term. Bryant’s appeal stemmed from a conviction where no motion to suppress or objection to the evidence was made. All cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the burden of proof should shift to the People to prove the admissibility of evidence seized during a warrantless search, when the defendant alleges the police testimony is untrustworthy and potentially fabricated.

Holding

No, because the defendant, as the party claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure, bears the ultimate burden of proving the illegality of the search. However, the People must initially come forward with evidence demonstrating the legality of the police conduct. As stated in the opinion, “The People must, of course, always show that police conduct was reasonable.”

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that under Section 813-c of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a “person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure” bears the burden of proving the illegality. While the People must initially demonstrate the legality of the police conduct (e.g., showing the search was incident to a lawful arrest or that the evidence was dropped in plain view), the ultimate burden rests with the defendant. The court rejected the argument that the rise in “dropsy” testimony warranted a shift in the burden, stating that it would be a “dismal reflection on society” to automatically view police testimony with suspicion. The court also reasoned that shifting the burden of proof would not necessarily prevent perjury, as the court would still need to assess the credibility of the officer’s testimony. The court emphasized the role of trial judges and appellate courts in assessing credibility and curtailing potential abuses. The Court suggested internal police procedures and prosecutorial discretion as more appropriate methods for addressing potential police misconduct. As Judge Scileppi wrote, “It would be a dismal reflection on society to say that when the guardians of its security are called to testify in court under oath, their testimony must be viewed with suspicion.” The court also noted, “There is no valid proof that all members of law enforcement agencies or that all other citizens who testify are perjurers. Therefore, all policemen should not be singled out as suspect as a matter of law.”