16 N.Y.2d 64 (1965)
A state court may recognize a divorce decree from another jurisdiction, even if not entitled to full faith and credit, based on principles of comity and estoppel, especially when a party has participated in obtaining the decree and a significant amount of time has passed.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a Surrogate was correct in recognizing an Alabama divorce decree, even if the decree was potentially subject to attack in Alabama for lack of actual residence. The Court held that the Surrogate was entitled to recognize the Alabama decree based on factors like the wife’s initial consent, the extended period since the divorce was granted, and the lack of demonstrable benefit to the wife from the divorce. The Court emphasized that while full faith and credit might not mandate recognition, comity and estoppel principles allowed the New York court to acknowledge the decree’s validity.
Facts
The decedent and his wife married in New York in 1948 and remained residents of New York. In 1959, the decedent obtained an Alabama divorce, allegedly without establishing bona fide residence. The wife signed an appearance and power of attorney for the Alabama proceedings. She claimed she didn’t understand the documents and only learned of the divorce after her husband’s death. The couple continued to file joint tax returns as husband and wife and the decedent provided partial support to the wife.
Procedural History
The Surrogate Court recognized the Alabama divorce decree and denied the wife’s application for letters of administration after the husband died intestate. The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s decision. Justice Munder dissented, arguing that the Alabama decree was void and not entitled to full faith and credit.
Issue(s)
Whether the Surrogate Court was required to give full faith and credit to the Alabama divorce decree, potentially invalid under Alabama law, thus precluding the wife from receiving letters of administration as the surviving spouse.
Holding
No, because even if the Alabama divorce decree wasn’t entitled to full faith and credit, the Surrogate court could recognize it based on comity and estoppel principles, considering the wife’s participation in the divorce proceedings, the significant delay before challenging it, and the absence of demonstrable benefit to the wife from the divorce.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court considered Alabama law regarding collusive “quickie” divorces, noting that such decrees could be vacated in Alabama, even on the court’s own motion. However, the Court also acknowledged that Alabama courts might not automatically set aside void decrees, especially if there was a significant delay or if the party seeking vacatur had obtained benefits from the divorce. Referencing Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, the court noted that void decrees are vacatable by the court in which they were rendered, if void on their face. The Court distinguished cases where parties were estopped from challenging divorces due to having received benefits. The Court reasoned that, despite the potential invalidity of the Alabama divorce under Alabama law, the nine-year lapse between the divorce and the challenge raised a strong likelihood of laches. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the Hartigan case focused on the *power* of the court to vacate, not an *obligation* to do so. More importantly, the court noted that the doctrine of comity allowed New York courts to recognize judgments from sister states even when full faith and credit did not apply. As the court stated, “Full faith and credit may compel New York to recognize a judgment of a sister State. The absence of full faith and credit does not mandate ignoring the judgment of a sister State”. The court concluded that preventing someone who participated in a fraud on another state’s court from benefiting by changing their position in New York was a valid basis for estoppel. The Court highlighted that it was not dealing with issues of personal jurisdiction or due process violations as in Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220. Therefore, the Surrogate was correct in recognizing the Alabama divorce decree.