People v. Graham, 27 N.Y.2d 678 (1970)
When a defendant is convicted of a lesser offense at a first trial, double jeopardy prevents a subsequent retrial from resulting in a conviction for a greater offense on the same count.
Summary
Graham was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder: felony murder and common-law murder. His first trial resulted in a conviction for felony murder and second-degree murder on the common-law count. Upon retrial, he was convicted of felony murder and first-degree murder on the common-law count. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Graham was initially convicted of second-degree murder on the common-law count, double jeopardy principles barred a subsequent conviction for first-degree murder on the same count. The court modified the judgment, reducing the degree of the crime to second-degree murder.
Facts
The defendant, Graham, was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder. The first count was felony murder, and the second count was common-law murder. At his initial trial, Graham was convicted of felony murder and second-degree murder under the common-law murder count. A retrial was ordered, and at the second trial, Graham was convicted of both felony murder and first-degree murder under the common-law count.
Procedural History
The case began in the County Court where Graham was initially tried and convicted. After the first trial resulted in a conviction for felony murder and second-degree murder on the common-law count, a retrial was granted. At the retrial, the defendant was convicted of felony murder and first-degree murder under the common-law count. The case then went to the Appellate Division, and subsequently, was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s judgment, reducing the degree of crime for which the defendant was convicted on the common-law count from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree and remanded the defendant to the County Court for resentencing.
Issue(s)
Whether, after being convicted of second-degree murder on a common-law murder count in an initial trial, the defendant could be retried and convicted of first-degree murder on the same common-law murder count without violating double jeopardy principles.
Holding
No, because the initial conviction of second-degree murder on the common-law count limited the scope of permissible conviction on retrial to no more than second-degree murder on that count.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals based its decision on the principle of double jeopardy, citing People v. Ressler, 17 N.Y.2d 174. The court reasoned that because Graham was initially convicted of murder in the second degree under the common-law count, he could not be tried for a greater offense (murder in the first degree) on the same count in a subsequent retrial. The court stated: “Having been convicted of murder, second degree, instead of murder, first degree, under the common-law count at the first trial, he could be tried for no more than murder, second degree, at the second trial.” This limitation stems from the constitutional protection against being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The court found no merit in the other arguments raised by the defendant. The decision emphasizes the finality and protection afforded by an initial conviction for a lesser included offense, preventing the prosecution from seeking a higher degree of culpability upon retrial.