People v. Gonzalez and Castellano, 27 N.Y.2d 53 (1970)
Pretrial identification procedures that are unnecessarily suggestive and create a substantial likelihood of misidentification can taint subsequent in-court identifications, rendering them inadmissible unless the prosecution proves by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification has an independent source.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether in-court identifications of the defendants were tainted by suggestive pretrial identification procedures. The dissent argued that a showup where police told witnesses “we caught this man, the robber of your store” and showing witnesses photographs of the defendants shortly before trial (16 months after the robbery) were impermissibly suggestive. The dissent concluded that the case should be remanded to determine whether the in-court identifications were influenced by these tainted procedures, especially since the witnesses’ initial observations were brief and made during a stressful robbery.
Facts
A robbery occurred, and sixteen months later, witnesses were shown photographs of the defendants just before they were to identify them in court. One witness initially gave the police a wrong description of one of the defendants. Another defendant, Castellano, had a full beard at the time of the robbery but was clean-shaven in the photograph shown to the witness before trial. Two witnesses viewed Castellano in a showup where police stated, “[w]e caught this man, the robber of your store.” One witness admitted he would not have been able to identify Castellano in court without the pretrial procedures.
Procedural History
The defendants were convicted of robbery based, in part, on eyewitness identifications. The dissenting judge in the New York Court of Appeals argued that the pretrial identification procedures were so suggestive that the in-court identifications were potentially tainted, requiring a hearing to determine the admissibility of the identification testimony.
Issue(s)
Whether the pretrial identification procedures (a showup and the showing of photographs shortly before trial) were so suggestive as to taint the subsequent in-court identifications, requiring a hearing to determine the independent source of the in-court identifications.
Holding
No, because the majority found that, on the present record, the in-court identifications were based on observations made at the scene of the crime, and the dissent failed to demonstrate that the identifications were tainted by the unnecessarily suggestive pretrial procedures.
Court’s Reasoning
Chief Judge Fuld, in dissent, argued that the pretrial identification procedures were highly suggestive and prejudicial. The dissent emphasized that the witness, Mrs. D’Amora, had only a brief and frightening encounter with Gonzalez, and she initially gave a wrong description to the police. Regarding Castellano, the dissent highlighted the suggestive showup where the police declared, “this was the robber of your store,” and the fact that the witnesses were shown photographs of Castellano just before entering the courtroom. The dissent quoted United States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d 912, stating:
“Lapse of time between the crime and the confrontation is also important; the longer the interval, the greater the dangers that the initial image will have dimmed and that the second image will play a significant role. Also, a long interval between the initial observation and the trial coupled with an improper confrontation a comparatively short time before the witness appears in court enhances the danger that he may be relying on his most recent encounter.”
The dissent believed that the prosecution failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the in-court identifications had independent sources. Referencing Foster v. California, 394 U. S. 440, 442, supra; Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 384; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 302; the dissent contended that there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, warranting a hearing to determine the impact of the pretrial procedures on the in-court identifications. The dissent emphasized that the witnesses’ observations occurred “but for a few minutes during a frightening and upsetting episode.”