People v. White, 26 N.Y.2d 276 (1970): When an Eyewitness is Considered an Accomplice Requiring Corroboration

People v. White, 26 N.Y.2d 276 (1970)

A witness is considered an accomplice, requiring corroboration of their testimony, only if they participated in the preparation or perpetration of the crime with the intent to assist, or if they counseled, induced, or encouraged the crime.

Summary

Michael White appealed his conviction for robbery, grand larceny, and assault, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that Ariel Alexis Slowe, a witness, might be an accomplice. White contended that if Slowe was an accomplice, her testimony would require corroboration. The Court of Appeals affirmed White’s conviction, holding that there was no evidence to suggest Slowe was an accomplice. Her mere presence and asking the victim for carfare did not demonstrate participation or intent to assist in the crime.

Facts

William Lance, the victim, was attacked and robbed near a subway station. Prior to the attack, Ariel Alexis Slowe asked Lance for carfare, which he provided. They walked to the subway station together. Three men then attacked Lance. Police arrested William Leroy White at the scene. Michael White (the appellant) and another defendant were arrested later based on information from Slowe. Neither the officers nor Lance could identify Michael White as one of the attackers at trial. Slowe testified that she knew the defendants and was present during the attack, even telling the assailants to leave Lance alone. A defense witness testified that Slowe was seen drinking with the codefendants earlier that day.

Procedural History

Michael White, William Leroy White, and William Wallace Brown were convicted in a jury trial of robbery in the first degree, grand larceny in the first degree, and assault in the second degree. White appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that Slowe might be an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that Ariel Alexis Slowe might be an accomplice, requiring corroboration of her testimony to convict the defendant.

Holding

No, because there was no evidence presented at trial to support a finding that Ariel Alexis Slowe was an accomplice to the crime.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the test for whether a witness is an accomplice is whether they could be indicted as a principal. This requires a showing that the witness participated in the preparation or perpetration of the crime with the intent to assist, or that the witness counseled, induced, or encouraged the crime. The court found no evidence in the record to suggest that Slowe was an accomplice. Her presence on the street, asking for carfare, and acquaintance with the perpetrators did not establish participation or intent to aid in the crime. The court emphasized that the token was borrowed a block away from the subway station and the victim was in no way distracted or misled by her for any purpose connected with the crime.

The court stated, “Her mere presence on a public street alone or her borrowing of a token from the victim would not have allowed the jury to infer that she participated in the commission of the crime.” It further explained that the victim was not lured into a deserted area and there was no indication she forced him to go to the station. The fact that she knew the perpetrators was not probative of her involvement or intent to aid in the crime. To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would require an accomplice charge whenever any eyewitness testified against the defendant. The court concluded that, as a matter of law, Slowe was not an accomplice.