Allen v. Cloutier Constr. Corp., 44 N.Y.2d 290 (1978)
New York Labor Law § 240, which requires safe scaffolding and equipment for construction workers, applies to painting work on a private dwelling, even if the work is not part of building construction, demolition, or repair, provided the worker is “employed” to perform the work.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of a claim under Labor Law § 240, holding that the statute’s protection extends to a painter injured while working on a private residence. The court found that the statute’s specific language regarding painting overrides the general heading of the article in which it is found (“Building construction, demolition and repair work”). The dissent argued that the statute should be read in its entirety and that painting, like cleaning (as previously held), when performed on a private dwelling is not covered by the statute.
Facts
The plaintiff, Allen, was injured while painting the exterior of a private residence. He fell from a ladder. He brought a claim under New York Labor Law § 240, which requires employers to provide safe scaffolding and equipment for workers engaged in certain types of labor. The defendant argued that § 240 did not apply because the painting was not part of building construction, demolition, or repair work.
Procedural History
The trial court initially ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the claim, relying on a previous case, Connors v. Boorstein, which held that Labor Law § 240 did not apply to window cleaning in a private dwelling. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether New York Labor Law § 240 applies to painting work performed on a private dwelling, even if the work is not part of building construction, demolition, or repair work.
Holding
Yes, because the specific language of § 240 includes painting and overrides the general heading of the article in which it is found; the statute applies broadly to a “person employing or directing another to perform labor of any kind in the…painting…of a building or structure.”
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that the specific language of Labor Law § 240 explicitly includes “painting.” Despite the article’s heading (“Building construction, demolition and repair work”), the court held that the specific terms of the statute control over the general heading. The court distinguished this case from Connors v. Boorstein, where the court held that window cleaning in a private dwelling was not covered by § 240. The court stated that Connors involved a “truly domestic” situation, implying a narrower scope than the present case. The court emphasized that the statute’s plain language covers “a person employing or directing another to perform labor of any kind in the…painting…of a building or structure.”
Notably, the dissenting opinion argued that the majority was improperly distinguishing between “cleaning” and “painting” without considering the overall spirit of the statute, as emphasized in Connors. The dissent contended that the statute should not be applied literally without regard to its context within the Labor Law, which primarily addresses building construction, demolition, and repair work. The dissent argued that the majority was elevating the specific mention of “painting” over the broader intent of the law, contrary to the principles established in Connors. The dissent stated, “It is my view that the majority’s distinction between ‘cleaning’ and ‘painting’ is unjustified. Moreover, this distinction has been drawn by employing a method of statutory construction expressly rejected in Connors itself.”