Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560 (1970)
Under District of Columbia law, a claim for invasion of privacy based on intrusion requires unreasonably intrusive conduct designed to elicit information of a confidential nature not available through normal inquiry or observation.
Summary
Ralph Nader sued General Motors (GM) for invasion of privacy based on GM’s alleged attempts to intimidate him after learning of his forthcoming book criticizing GM’s automotive safety. The complaint detailed several intrusive actions. The New York Court of Appeals, applying District of Columbia law, held that while some of GM’s actions (like overzealous surveillance and wiretapping) could constitute an invasion of privacy, others (like general questioning and harassment) did not, as they didn’t seek confidential information through unreasonable means. The court clarified the scope of “intrusion” within the tort of invasion of privacy.
Facts
Ralph Nader, an author and automotive safety critic, was the target of an alleged intimidation campaign by General Motors (GM) after GM learned of his forthcoming book, “Unsafe at any Speed.” Nader alleged that GM’s agents engaged in the following activities: (1) interviewed acquaintances, casting aspersions on his character and views; (2) kept him under surveillance in public places; (3) had him accosted by women to entice him into illicit relationships; (4) made threatening phone calls; (5) tapped his phone and eavesdropped on private conversations; and (6) conducted a harassing investigation into his background.
Procedural History
Nader filed suit in New York, alleging four causes of action, including two for invasion of privacy. GM moved to dismiss the first two causes of action. The lower courts denied the motion to dismiss. GM appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission of the Appellate Division on a certified question regarding the legal sufficiency of the invasion of privacy claims.
Issue(s)
Whether, under District of Columbia law, the alleged actions by General Motors, including interviewing acquaintances, surveillance, attempts at entrapment, harassing phone calls, wiretapping, and a harassing investigation, constitute actionable invasions of privacy.
Holding
1. No, because interviewing acquaintances and casting aspersions on Nader’s character does not seek confidential information through unreasonable intrusion.
2. No, because accosting by girls and harassing phone calls, though offensive, do not involve gathering private or confidential information.
3. Yes, because unauthorized wiretapping and eavesdropping constitute a tortious intrusion under District of Columbia law.
4. The court did not provide a conclusive yes or no, but stated that under certain circumstances, overzealous surveillance may be actionable, depending on the nature of the proof.
Court’s Reasoning
The court analyzed the scope of invasion of privacy under District of Columbia law, referencing cases like Pearson v. Dodd and Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe. The court emphasized that the right to privacy protects against unreasonable and serious interference with another’s interest in not having their private affairs known to others. The court differentiated between actions that merely annoy or harass and those that intrude into a person’s private affairs to gather confidential information. While actions like wiretapping and overzealous surveillance aimed at uncovering private details are actionable, general questioning or harassment, though potentially offensive, do not constitute an invasion of privacy unless they involve the gathering of private information through improper means.
The court reasoned that information already known to others cannot be considered private. “Information about the plaintiff which was already known to others could hardly be regarded as private to the plaintiff.” The court also noted that while harassment may give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, that cause of action has different elements than invasion of privacy. As for surveillance, the court stated, “A person does not automatically make public everything he does merely by being in a public place”.
The court found that because the complaint included allegations (wiretapping and possibly overzealous surveillance) sufficient to state a cause of action, the motion to dismiss was properly denied, even though other allegations were insufficient. The court clarified that the non-actionable allegations could still be pertinent to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.