People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139 (1969): Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements When Defendant is Represented

People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139 (1969)

A spontaneous statement made by a defendant to the police, even when in custody and represented by counsel who is not present, is admissible as evidence if the statement is not the product of interrogation.

Summary

Kaye was arrested for homicide. While being transported to the police station, and after being informed of his rights, he spontaneously confessed to the crime. The court addressed whether the confession was admissible, considering that the defendant was in custody and represented by counsel who was not present. The court held that the confession was admissible because it was a volunteered statement, not the product of custodial interrogation, and therefore not barred by the Fifth Amendment or the right to counsel. The court emphasized that the detectives had even reminded the defendant that he did not have to speak to them and that his attorney advised him of that.

Facts

Detectives discovered the body of a 13-year-old boy in Kaye’s hotel room, the cause of death was strangulation. Kaye’s attorney and father surrendered Kaye to the police at Bellevue Hospital. The attorney informed Detective McNally that he had advised Kaye of his constitutional rights, and instructed him not to make any statements. The attorney declined to accompany Kaye to the police station, stating he would see the detective in court the next morning. Almost immediately after entering the police car, Kaye spontaneously stated, “It’s all a mistake, but I know he forgave me. He’s in heaven now. It didn’t have to happen. I’m sorry I ever met him in the village.” Detective McNally reminded Kaye of his right to remain silent and that his lawyer had already advised him of that fact. Kaye insisted on talking, stating he wanted to tell his side of the story.

Procedural History

A Huntley hearing was held to determine the voluntariness of Kaye’s confessions. The confession obtained at the police station was suppressed because the police knew Kaye was represented by counsel and questioned him without his attorney present. However, the court found the oral confession in the police car was spontaneous and voluntary. Kaye withdrew his not guilty plea and pled guilty to manslaughter in the first degree, receiving a sentence of 10 to 15 years. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding the confession admissible as a voluntary statement, not the product of questioning.

Issue(s)

Whether a spontaneous oral confession must be suppressed, as a matter of law, solely because the defendant was under arrest and represented by counsel at the time he volunteered his confession.

Holding

No, because the Fifth Amendment does not bar volunteered statements, and the confession was not the product of custodial interrogation.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the central issue is whether the defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation. The court cited Miranda v. Arizona, emphasizing that while custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, volunteered statements are admissible. The court quoted Miranda, “Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.” The court distinguished prior cases like People v. Arthur, clarifying that those cases prohibit custodial interrogation of a suspect represented by counsel in the attorney’s absence, when police are aware of the representation. Here, Kaye initiated the conversation and insisted on speaking despite being advised of his rights. The detective’s suggestion that Kaye start from the beginning did not constitute interrogation. The court weighed the trustworthiness of voluntary confessions, noting that no court has required police to prevent a suspect from making a spontaneous incriminating statement. To do so, would stretch the comprehension of the average citizen to the breaking point and would lead to unfair and impractical results. As Justice Cardozo said, “[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament.” Chief Judge Fuld and Judge Burke dissented arguing that no statement made in the absence of counsel should have been used against defendant, whether spontaneous or not, once he had been arrested and taken into custody and his lawyer had informed the police that he had advised the defendant not to make any statements.