Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 28 N.Y.2d 62 (1971)
A declaratory judgment action regarding marital status accrues upon the maturation of the right being asserted (e.g., a widow’s pension), not necessarily when the controversy regarding marital status first arises; furthermore, laches requires both unreasonable delay and prejudice to the opposing party.
Summary
Erminia Sorrentino sued to declare her the lawful widow of Alphonse Sorrentino, challenging the validity of his Nevada divorce and subsequent remarriage to Verna Mieyzwa. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations did not bar the action, as Erminia’s right to a widow’s pension only matured upon Alphonse’s death, and she promptly sued thereafter. The court also found no laches, as Erminia’s delay in bringing the action did not unduly prejudice Verna, especially since Verna could testify to Alphonse’s domicile in Nevada. The court upheld the finding that Alphonse never established a bona fide residence in Nevada, rendering the divorce invalid.
Facts
Erminia and Alphonse Sorrentino married in 1927 and separated in 1939, after which Alphonse voluntarily paid support. In 1951, Alphonse obtained a default divorce decree in Nevada and immediately married Verna Mieyzwa. Erminia was served with process but, relying on legal advice, did not appear in the Nevada action. Alphonse and Verna resided in New Jersey until Alphonse’s death in 1965. In 1952, Erminia obtained a support order from the New York Family Court, which implicitly recognized her marital status. Both Erminia and Verna applied for a widow’s pension after Alphonse’s death.
Procedural History
Erminia sued in Supreme Court for a declaratory judgment that she was Alphonse’s lawful widow and that the Nevada divorce was invalid. The trial court initially dismissed the complaint but, after granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, ruled in Erminia’s favor. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and laches.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the statute of limitations for a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of a divorce decree begins to run when the party becomes aware of the controversy or when the right being asserted matures (e.g., entitlement to a widow’s pension).
2. Whether Erminia’s delay in bringing the action constituted laches, barring her claim.
Holding
1. No, because the statute of limitations begins to run when the right being asserted matures, not simply when a justiciable controversy arises.
2. No, because laches requires both unreasonable delay and prejudice to the opposing party, and neither was sufficiently established here.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute of limitations should not bar an action to enforce a right before it has even matured. Erminia’s right to the widow’s pension only matured upon Alphonse’s death; thus, the statute of limitations began to run at that time. Regarding laches, the court emphasized that mere delay is insufficient; prejudice to the opposing party must also be shown. The court noted that Erminia had diligently obtained a support order and a determination that she was still married to Alphonse. Moreover, the court found that Verna was not unduly prejudiced by Alphonse’s death, as she could testify to his intent regarding domicile in Nevada. The court cited Feldman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 App. Div. 123, 125, stating that “Laches…is not mere delay but delay that works disadvantage or injury.” The court also distinguished cases where remarriage and reliance on the divorce decree created prejudice. The court was bound by the finding that Alphonse never established a bona fide residence in Nevada, thus the divorce was invalid.