People v. Williams, 25 N.Y.2d 86 (1969)
Even if an initial entry onto property is lawful, a person can be convicted of resisting arrest if, after being informed they are under arrest, they passively resist by refusing to move, thereby obstructing a police officer in the performance of their duty, provided the officer had reasonable grounds to believe a crime was being committed.
Summary
Defendants were convicted of resisting a public officer. They initially entered the Governor’s office with permission, but later refused to leave when asked, leading to their arrest for unlawful intrusion and resisting arrest. The Court of Appeals affirmed the resisting arrest convictions. Even though the initial entry was lawful (overturning the unlawful intrusion charges), the court held that the police had reasonable grounds to believe a crime was being committed, and the defendants’ refusal to cooperate with the arrest constituted resistance under the law. This case clarifies that passive resistance can be a crime and that the lawfulness of an arrest depends on the officer’s reasonable belief at the time, not solely on the ultimate outcome of the underlying charge.
Facts
Representatives of the Joint Committee on Equal Opportunity were protesting at the Governor’s NYC office and had permission to have a limited number of members inside. A group of seven members, including the appellants, attempted to enter the office when three other members were already inside. A security guard informed them that only nine members were allowed in the press room. When the seven refused to leave or reduce their number, they sat down on the stairs. The Governor ordered their removal, and police were summoned. After refusing a police request to leave, they were arrested. Frieder and Glick voluntarily left, but the appellants refused to move and had to be physically carried out.
Procedural History
The appellants were convicted of unlawful intrusion and resisting a public officer. The Appellate Term reversed the unlawful intrusion convictions based on a prior case, People v. Lawson. However, the Appellate Term affirmed the convictions for resisting a public officer. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal the affirmance of the resisting arrest convictions.
Issue(s)
Whether police officers had reasonable grounds to believe that the crime of unlawful intrusion was being committed, thus making the arrest lawful even though the initial entry was authorized.
Whether the appellants’ refusal to move after being told they were under arrest constituted willful resistance of a public officer under the former Penal Law § 1851.
Holding
Yes, because the police did not have to know that the original entry was lawful in order to reasonably believe that the crime of unlawful intrusion was being committed.
Yes, because the appellants’ refusal to act as directed by the officers was an obstruction to the police in performing their duty, and each appellant delayed his own arrest, and necessarily the arrest of the others.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that the amendment to Section 177(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, effective July 1, 1963, allowed an officer to arrest without a warrant if they had “reasonable grounds to believe” a crime was being committed. The court emphasized that, unlike pre-amendment cases, an acquittal of the underlying crime is no longer dispositive of the lawfulness of the arrest. The Court found that the police did not necessarily know that the appellants’ initial entry was authorized. Absent such knowledge, the officers could reasonably believe that unlawful intrusion was occurring. Even if the initial entrance was lawful, it does not automatically negate the lawfulness of the arrest, because it is based on what the officer reasonably believed at the time of the arrest.
Regarding the resisting arrest charge, the Court rejected the argument that inaction cannot constitute resistance. The Court stated, “The appellants’ refusal to act as directed was an obstruction to the police officers in the performance of their duty. Each of the appellants delayed his own arrest and necessarily the arrest of the others.” The Court cited People v. Martinez, 43 Misc 2d 94, and People v. Knight, 35 Misc 2d 216, 222, to support its holding that passive resistance constitutes resistance under the statute. The Court concluded that to hold otherwise would “inhibit the public officer in the performance of his duty”.