Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 25 N.Y.2d 237 (1969)
The Legislature possesses broad authority to enact statutes regulating practice and procedure in the courts, including limitations on a court’s power to dismiss cases for failure to prosecute.
Summary
This case addresses the constitutionality of CPLR 3216, which requires a defendant to serve a 45-day demand on the plaintiff to file a note of issue before moving to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute. The Court of Appeals held that CPLR 3216 is constitutional, finding that the Legislature has the power to regulate practice and procedure in the courts. The court reasoned that the power to dismiss for failure to prosecute was initially a legislative creation, not an inherent judicial power, and the statute doesn’t unconstitutionally infringe upon judicial prerogatives.
Facts
In Cohn, the plaintiffs sued for personal injuries sustained in 1961, commencing the action in 1964. After the defendant answered and demanded a bill of particulars, no action was taken until 1967, when the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute. In Blankenship, the plaintiff alleged breach of contract in a suit commenced in 1960. After some initial activity, the plaintiff took no action for over four years, prompting the defendant to move to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
Procedural History
In Cohn, the lower court denied the motion to dismiss, citing the defendant’s failure to serve the 45-day demand required by the newly enacted CPLR 3216. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the statute unconstitutional and directing dismissal. In Blankenship, the lower court granted the motion to dismiss, citing the excessive delay, and the Appellate Division affirmed without opinion, following its Cohn decision. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether CPLR 3216, which requires a defendant to serve a 45-day demand on the plaintiff to file a note of issue before moving to dismiss for failure to prosecute, is an unconstitutional infringement on the court’s inherent power to control its calendar.
Holding
No, because the Legislature has broad authority to enact statutes regulating practice and procedure in the courts, including limitations on a court’s power to dismiss cases for failure to prosecute.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the power to dismiss actions for undue delay was a legislative creation, not an inherent judicial power. The court traced the history of dismissal for failure to prosecute, noting that it originated in colonial legislation. The Court cited Section 30 of Article VI of the New York Constitution, explicitly granting the Legislature broad power to formulate rules of procedure, limited only by the power it had “heretofore exercised.” While acknowledging that some matters are beyond legislative reach due to the nature of governmental structure, the Court found the authority to regulate practice and procedure lies principally with the Legislature.
The Court distinguished the prior case of Riglander v. Star Co., where a statute mandating trial dates was deemed unconstitutional. Unlike the statute in Riglander, which interfered with the court’s discretion over its calendar, CPLR 3216 only provides a procedural opportunity to correct a default. As the Court noted, “The courts are not the puppets of the Legislature…And while the Legislature has the power to alter and regulate the proceedings in law and equity, it can only exercise such power in that respect as it has heretofore exercised; and it has never before attempted to deprive the courts of that judicial discretion which they have been always accustomed to exercise.”
The Court emphasized the practical considerations, cautioning that invalidating CPLR 3216 would jeopardize numerous other provisions of the CPLR and undermine the concept of a statutory code of judicial procedure. The Court concluded by stating that it must accord to the Legislature a considerable degree of controlling effect over the powers of the court and that a section’s inconsistency with their own vision of efficient judicial administration is insufficient basis for deeming it unconstitutional.