29 N.Y.2d 505 (1971)
A union constitution’s power to amend allows for reasonable changes to pension plans, even for members who joined before the amendment, as long as the changes are made in good faith and do not affect those already receiving benefits or with approved applications.
Summary
Morris Sarnow, a member of the Moving Picture Machine Operators’ Union, sued to recover pension benefits he claimed he should have received between ages 60 and 65, arguing that a 1956 amendment increasing the retirement age from 60 to 65 did not apply to him because he had joined the union before the amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the union constitution reserved the power to amend the pension plan, and the 1956 amendment was a reasonable change made in good faith. The court also found no evidence to support Sarnow’s claim that the trustees abused their discretion by not waiving the requirements due to his alleged inability to engage in gainful employment.
Facts
Morris Sarnow joined the Moving Picture Machine Operators’ Union in 1929. In 1944, he moved to Florida for health reasons. Prior to his move, the union incorporated a retirement plan providing weekly benefits to members aged 60 with 20 years of continuous membership. In 1951, a jointly administered pension fund was established, financed by employer contributions. Members not employed by contributing employers, like Sarnow, could participate by paying contributions. In 1956, due to financial difficulties, the union amended its constitution to increase contributions and defer the retirement age from 60 to 65 for members not working for contributing employers. Sarnow paid the increased assessments without protest until filing a complaint in 1964. He turned 65 in 1967 and began receiving a pension while pursuing his claim for benefits from ages 60 to 65.
Procedural History
Sarnow sued to recover pension benefits from age 60 to 65 and the contributions he paid during that time. Special Term denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that Sarnow had a vested right to his pension at the original terms. Special Term later granted partial summary judgment for Sarnow, ruling that the amendment could not affect his vested interest. The Appellate Division affirmed both orders. Sarnow then obtained final summary judgment against the fund but not the union. The Court of Appeals reviewed the intermediate appellate affirmance.
Issue(s)
Whether the 1956 amendment to the union constitution, which increased the retirement age from 60 to 65 for certain members, validly applied to a member who joined the union before the amendment but had not yet satisfied the original retirement requirements.
Holding
No, because the union constitution contained a clear reservation of the power to amend, and the 1956 amendment was a reasonable change made in good faith to address the fund’s financial difficulties. It did not affect members already receiving pensions or with approved applications.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on Everett v. Supreme Council, Catholic Benevolent Legion, 236 N.Y. 62 (1923), stating: “Where the reservation of authority to amend a charter or the constitution and by-laws of a society is clear, the right to have the rate of assessment and amount of benefit continued as originally provided is not vested or fixed beyond the possibility of reasonable changes to meet new conditions.” The court found that Article XI of the union’s constitution specifically reserved the power to amend. The court rejected Sarnow’s argument that the 1944 constitution didn’t reserve the power to amend the pension plan, noting that the constitution itself contained a general amendment power. The court emphasized that amendments are permissible to meet new conditions, implying the financial strain on the fund justified the change. The court also dismissed Sarnow’s argument that the trustees should have waived the retirement requirements based on his alleged disability, finding insufficient evidence to prove he was incapable of any gainful employment. The court stated the only evidence was a 1944 union letter requesting assistance finding him work, which did not demonstrate the required inability to perform “any gainful employment”.