People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241 (1969)
A criminal defendant who testifies may be cross-examined about prior immoral, vicious, or criminal acts relevant to their credibility, and extrinsic evidence may be used to contradict the defendant’s answers if that evidence is independently admissible on an issue other than credibility.
Summary
Schwartzman, president of Safety Circuit Corporation, was convicted of grand larceny for falsely representing an account receivable as unencumbered. On appeal, he argued improper cross-examination concerning 22 alleged instances of prior misconduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the cross-examination was within the trial court’s discretion because the prior acts related to obtaining money by false pretenses and were relevant to Schwartzman’s credibility. The court also addressed the use of documentary evidence to impeach Schwartzman’s testimony, finding it permissible because the evidence was independently admissible to prove intent to defraud, an essential element of the crime.
Facts
Roslyn Gladstone purchased an account receivable from Safety Circuit Corporation, represented by Schwartzman as unencumbered. In reality, Schwartzman had previously assigned the same receivable to Lester Balagur. Gladstone was unable to collect on the receivable. At trial, Schwartzman admitted to the double assignment, claiming Gladstone’s husband, acting as her agent, knew of the prior assignment. Mr. Gladstone denied this knowledge. The prosecution cross-examined Schwartzman extensively about 22 alleged instances of prior misconduct involving worthless checks, mortgaging property he didn’t own, and similar fraudulent activities.
Procedural History
Schwartzman was convicted of grand larceny in the first degree in a jury trial and sentenced to 2 1/2 to 5 years imprisonment. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction. Schwartzman appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing he was denied a fair trial due to improper cross-examination regarding other criminal acts.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant regarding prior immoral, vicious, or criminal acts was an abuse of discretion?
2. Whether the use of documentary evidence during the cross-examination of the defendant was an impermissible use of extrinsic evidence on collateral matters?
Holding
1. No, because the nature and extent of cross-examination is subject to the sound discretion of the Trial Judge and the acts inquired into had a bearing on his credibility as a witness.
2. No, because an exception to the rule against extrinsic evidence on collateral matters exists where the evidence is relevant to an issue in the case other than credibility, or if independently admissible to impeach the witness.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that a defendant who testifies can be cross-examined about immoral, vicious, or criminal acts relevant to their credibility. Such offenses need not be similar to the charged crime, and the number of questions is not improper if asked in good faith with some factual basis. The court cited People v. Sorge, stating that a negative response does not preclude further inquiry to elicit a change in testimony.
The court addressed the use of documentary evidence, reaffirming the rule that a cross-examiner cannot contradict a witness’s answers on collateral matters with extrinsic evidence solely to impeach credibility. However, an exception exists if the evidence is relevant to an issue other than credibility or independently admissible for impeachment. The court cited People v. Sorge, noting that the collateral evidence rule aims to prevent confusion and unfair surprise. Here, the court found the documentary evidence regarding the chattel mortgage was independently admissible to show intent to defraud, an essential element of grand larceny.
The court cited People v. Molineux for the proposition that evidence of other crimes is admissible to establish motive or intention. Because Schwartzman admitted the transaction, his intent was the only fact in dispute, and evidence of similar misrepresentations was crucial. Quoting Wigmore, the court emphasized that “the essence of this probative effect is the likeness of the instance.”
The court found one error: the prosecutor asked about a check charge for which Schwartzman had been acquitted. However, the court found the prosecutor acted in good faith, unaware of the acquittal, and the error was harmless given the other evidence. The court also declined to review a comment on the right to appeal, as no objection was made at trial.