24 N.Y.2d 21 (1969)
A prospective parolee does not have a constitutional right to be represented by counsel at a hearing before the Board of Parole.
Summary
Briguglio, convicted of attempted grand larceny, sought a new parole hearing with counsel, arguing his rights were violated when the Board of Parole denied him parole without representation or the ability to present evidence. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ dismissal of his petition, holding that parole release proceedings are administrative, not judicial, and do not require adversary hearings or the right to counsel. The court emphasized parole is a statutory privilege, not a constitutional right, and the Board’s discretionary power is broad, absent statutory violations.
Facts
Salvatore Briguglio was convicted of attempted grand larceny and sentenced to an indeterminate term of two to four years, beginning August 5, 1966. After serving 16 months, he became eligible for parole on October 29, 1967. On August 8, 1967, the Board of Parole examined him but denied parole, deeming him a poor parole risk.
Procedural History
Briguglio filed a special proceeding in the Supreme Court, Albany County, seeking a declaration that the Board of Parole’s decision was unconstitutional and requesting a new hearing with counsel. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the judgment without opinion. Briguglio appealed to the New York Court of Appeals on constitutional grounds.
Issue(s)
Whether a prospective parolee has a constitutional right to a judicial-type hearing, including the right to be represented by counsel, before the Board of Parole regarding release on parole.
Holding
No, because parole is a statutory privilege granted as a matter of grace, not a constitutional right, and the parole release proceeding is an administrative function, not a judicial one requiring an adversary hearing.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals distinguished Mempa v. Rhay and In re Gault, cases cited by Briguglio, noting that Mempa concerned the right to counsel at sentencing (a critical stage of a criminal proceeding), not parole release, and Gault addressed due process rights in juvenile delinquency adjudications, not post-adjudicative processes like parole. The court emphasized that parole in New York is a comprehensive, legislatively created system of rehabilitation. The Board of Parole’s determination to grant parole “depends upon information in regard to the personal traits and characteristics of the individual convicted and upon unanimous concurrence of the individual members of the Board acting upon such information and personal observations” (Matter of Hines v. State Bd. of Parole, 293 N.Y. 254, 257). The Court cited Escoe v. Zerbst, stating, “'[Parole] comes as a matter of grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such conditions * * * as [the Legislature] may impose’” (Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-493). The court deferred to the legislature to alter the parole system, citing the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, which rejects the right to counsel at parole hearings. The court also upheld the statutory provision (Correction Law § 212) deeming the Board of Parole’s actions a judicial function, not reviewable if done according to law, reaffirming its stance from Matter of Hines and refusing to involve the courts in superintending the parole system.