People v. Moro, 23 N.Y.2d 496 (1969)

The recent and exclusive possession of stolen property, if unexplained or falsely explained, allows a jury to infer that the possessor is a criminal, but the jury must determine whether the possessor is the thief or merely a receiver of stolen goods; the defendant cannot be convicted of both crimes.

Summary

Charles Moro was convicted of criminally concealing and withholding stolen property and possessing burglar’s tools, but acquitted of grand larceny. The key evidence involved a stolen car found near Moro, a known “street mechanic,” with alterations suggesting he was dismantling it. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury could infer guilt from Moro’s unexplained possession of the stolen car, even though he was acquitted of stealing it. The court clarified that the inference of guilt arises from unexplained possession and does not violate the defendant’s right to remain silent.

Facts

Rene Cartayas reported his 1960 Oldsmobile stolen. Three days later, police officers familiar with Charles Moro, a local “street mechanic,” spotted him driving a similar car. The next day, the officers found the car, with the same license plate, near Moro. It had been partially dismantled and altered. Moro could not produce a driver’s license or registration for the car. The police confirmed the car was stolen from Cartayas. Moro possessed a key that fit the car. The car was inoperable when recovered.

Procedural History

Moro was indicted on five counts, but only three were submitted to the jury: grand larceny, criminally concealing and withholding stolen property, and unlawfully possessing burglar’s tools. The jury acquitted Moro of grand larceny but convicted him of the other two charges. Moro appealed, arguing it was improper to convict him of receiving stolen property and that the judge prejudiced him by remarking on his unexplained possession of the stolen car. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a jury can convict a defendant of criminally receiving stolen property when there is evidence that someone else may have stolen the property, and the defendant was in recent and exclusive possession of it.
2. Whether a judge’s remark about the defendant’s unexplained possession of a stolen car violates the defendant’s right to remain silent.

Holding

1. Yes, because the recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of a crime, if unexplained, justifies the inference that the possessor is a criminal, and the jury determines whether the possessor is the thief or merely a receiver of stolen goods.
2. No, because the inference of guilt arises from the unexplained possession of the stolen property, and the judge properly instructed the jury not to draw any inferences from the defendant’s failure to testify.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on the established principle that “recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of crime, if unexplained or falsely explained, will justify the inference that the possessor is the criminal.” The court distinguished between the act of stealing and the act of receiving stolen property, noting that a defendant cannot be convicted of both crimes, but can be indicted for both, allowing the jury to determine the appropriate charge based on the evidence. In Moro’s case, the evidence suggested he may not have been the original thief but was instead dismantling the car, justifying the conviction for receiving stolen property. The court noted that the alterations to the car were not such that an experienced mechanic could not have performed them quickly.

Regarding the defendant’s right to remain silent, the court clarified that the inference of guilt arises from the unexplained possession of the stolen property, not from the defendant’s failure to testify. The court emphasized that the inference can be overcome by evidence presented to explain the possession, even without the defendant’s testimony. The court also highlighted that the trial judge instructed the jury that no adverse inferences should be drawn from the defendant’s decision not to testify, mitigating any potential prejudice. The court cited Wangrow v. United States, 399 F. 2d 106, 118, supporting this view.