People v. Cefaro, 23 N.Y.2d 283 (1968)

A trial judge is only required to instruct the jury on the voluntariness of a confession if the issue of voluntariness has been raised at trial through proper objection and sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute.

Summary

Defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the voluntariness of their confessions. The New York Court of Appeals held that a trial judge only needs to instruct the jury on voluntariness if the issue has been properly raised at trial with sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute. The court reasoned that without such a requirement, juries would be asked to make determinations in a factual vacuum, undermining the jury system. However, the Court reversed Cefaro’s conviction because the admission of his codefendants’ confessions, which implicated him, violated his right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States.

Facts

Defendants Cefaro, Josephs, and Russo were tried jointly. Prior to trial, a Huntley hearing was held to determine the voluntariness of confessions made by the defendants. The Huntley judge determined the confessions were voluntary. At trial, the confessions were admitted into evidence without objection from any of the defendants. No defendant testified or presented evidence challenging the voluntariness of the confessions. After both sides rested, Josephs’ counsel requested the judge to instruct the jury on the issue of voluntariness. The judge denied the request, stating that the issue had not been raised during the trial. Cefaro admitted being in a car with the other defendants on the night of the crimes but denied participating in the burglary.

Procedural History

Following a jury trial, the defendants were convicted. The defendants appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the voluntariness of their confessions. The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed the convictions. Reargument was granted. On reargument, the Court of Appeals reversed Cefaro’s conviction, but adhered to its original affirmance for Josephs and Russo.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a trial judge is required to instruct the jury on the voluntariness of a confession when a pretrial Huntley hearing has been held, but the issue of voluntariness was not raised during the trial.
2. Whether Cefaro’s motion for severance should have been granted, and whether the joint trial resulted in a deprivation of his right of cross-examination secured by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, given that the confessions of his co-defendants, which implicated him, were admitted into evidence with cautionary instructions.

Holding

1. No, because a trial judge is required to charge on voluntariness only if the issue has been raised at trial by a proper objection, and evidence sufficient to raise a factual dispute has been presented either through direct or cross-examination.
2. Yes, because the admission of the confessions of Cefaro’s codefendants, which were highly prejudicial and technically inadmissible against Cefaro, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that prior to Jackson v. Denno and People v. Huntley, New York law presumed confessions were voluntary unless the defendant objected and presented evidence to the contrary. Jackson v. Denno did not change this rule, but rather, it required states to adopt procedures ensuring a defendant could object to a confession and have a fair hearing on voluntariness, independent of the confession’s truthfulness. The Court stated, “Manifestly this language, is directly opposed to defendants’ contention on this reargument, for our reference to a submission of the voluntariness question to the jury assumes that voluntariness has somehow been contested by a defendant during the trial.“

The Court distinguished People v. Mials, noting that in Mials, voluntariness was put in issue through cross-examination, unlike the present case where voluntariness was not raised at all. The Court emphasized the importance of a factual basis for jury determinations, stating, “If, without observing even the faintest manifestation of a dispute on a voluntariness question, the jury must still be charged on that issue, then the 12 triers of the facts would be given a license and, indeed, encouraged to make a determination in a factual vacuum, i.e., without evidentiary basis whatsoever. Clearly such a rule militates against the basic concept of the jury system.”

Regarding Cefaro’s claim, the Court found that his motion for severance should have been granted under Bruton v. United States, as the confessions of his codefendants implicated him and were admitted without effective redaction. The Court rejected the District Attorney’s argument for applying the harmless error doctrine, finding that Cefaro’s mere presence at the scene, as he admitted, did not negate the prejudice caused by the codefendants’ confessions, which portrayed him as an active participant in the burglary. The court stated that it could not “in all fairness say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”