People v. Gunner, 27 N.Y.2d 529 (1970)

Confessions obtained from a defendant after an information has been filed and an arrest warrant issued, in the absence of counsel, are inadmissible unless the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived their right to counsel.

Summary

Gunner was convicted of robbery. The conviction was appealed based on the admission of eleven inculpatory statements made without counsel and a police officer’s testimony regarding a pre-trial identification. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the eight statements made to New York officials after the filing of an information and issuance of an arrest warrant were inadmissible due to the absence of counsel, as the defendant’s purported waiver of counsel was invalid. The court also found that the admission of the police officer’s testimony regarding pre-trial identification was prejudicial error, especially given the questionable nature of the victim’s identification.

Facts

Seven months after an armed robbery in Westchester County, Gunner appeared at police headquarters in Cheyenne, Wyoming. He was arrested for vagrancy after admitting he “could be wanted for questioning”. Captain Smith and F.B.I. agent Jones interrogated Gunner. Conflicting testimonies emerged regarding whether Gunner requested a lawyer. He allegedly confessed to the robbery but refused to sign a statement. The Westchester police, informed of Gunner’s apprehension, filed an information against him and obtained an arrest warrant. Upon arrival in Cheyenne, they questioned Gunner, who confessed after being promised a meal. He was not provided a lawyer despite asking for one, being told to find one in a phonebook. On the return trip to New York, and upon arrival, Gunner confessed multiple times. He was eventually arraigned.

Procedural History

Gunner was convicted of robbery in the second degree. He challenged the voluntariness of his confessions in a post-trial hearing, which was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed both the conviction and the denial of post-conviction relief. Gunner then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the eleven inculpatory statements made by Gunner over the course of three weeks were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights and thus inadmissible as evidence?
2. Whether the admission of testimony by a police officer regarding the complaining witness’s previous identification of Gunner constituted prejudicial error?

Holding

1. Yes, because the eight statements made to New York officers after the filing of the information and issuance of an arrest warrant were inadmissible due to the absence of counsel, and Gunner did not validly waive his right to counsel.
2. Yes, because the bolstering testimony regarding a prior identification was prejudicial, given the circumstances of the robbery and the doubts surrounding the victim’s identification of Gunner.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the vagrancy arrest in Wyoming was a pretext to enable custodial interrogation about the New York robbery charge. The eight statements made to the New York officers after the information was filed and the warrant obtained were inadmissible unless a valid waiver of counsel occurred. The court found no such valid waiver, stating that offering an indigent defendant a telephone book in a strange city does not constitute a meaningful opportunity to obtain counsel. Gunner’s attempts to seek legal assistance further undermined any finding of waiver. The court cited People v. Di Biasi, 7 NY 2d 544 and People v. Waterman, 9 NY 2d 561 to support the inadmissibility of post-indictment/information statements made in the absence of counsel.

Regarding the identification testimony, the court cited People v. Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471 and stated that bolstering testimony is only permissible when identity is not a substantial issue or when the identification is attacked as a recent fabrication. Given the victim’s limited opportunity to view the robber and his uncertainty in identifying Gunner, coupled with the lack of an attack on the identification, the admission of the officer’s testimony was deemed prejudicial error. The court emphasized that if the inculpatory statements were excluded, the identification issue became crucial, exacerbating the prejudice caused by the erroneous admission. As stated by the court, “the right to counsel before defendant is questioned, after information and warrant proceedings but before arraignment, as here, is not waived where the indigent defendant, an adjudicated vagrant, has only the alternatives of proceeding without counsel or retaining a lawyer from a telephone book in a strange city.”