Bucci v. Village of Port Chester, 22 N.Y.2d 197 (1968)
In actions to recover prevailing wage deficiencies under Labor Law § 220, the three-month statute of limitations for commencing an action against the employer begins to run only after a final determination has been reached, including the resolution of any legal challenges to the underlying administrative wage determination.
Summary
Employees of the Village of Port Chester sued to recover unpaid prevailing wages. The central issue was whether the lawsuit was timely filed, given the statutory three-month limitation period. The Industrial Commissioner had determined that the Village had not paid prevailing wages, a decision the Village challenged unsuccessfully in an Article 78 proceeding, including motions for reargument and leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals held that the three-month period began to run only after all challenges to the Commissioner’s determination were exhausted, ensuring that employees were not required to sue while the underlying wage determination remained legally uncertain. Therefore, the action was timely commenced.
Facts
Fifty-eight employees of the Village of Port Chester believed they were underpaid compared to prevailing wage rates. In 1950, they initiated proceedings before the State Industrial Commissioner to determine the appropriate prevailing wage rates. The Industrial Commissioner ultimately determined that the Village had not paid prevailing wages. After years of litigation, the employees commenced an action in December 1964 to recover back pay and interest from 1950 through 1963. The Village argued the suit was untimely.
Procedural History
The Industrial Commissioner filed an order fixing prevailing wage rates on October 3, 1963. The Village then filed an Article 78 proceeding to review the Commissioner’s determination. The Appellate Division confirmed the Commissioner’s determination, serving its order on the Village on July 29, 1964. The Village’s motion for reargument or leave to appeal was denied on October 15, 1964. The employees then commenced their action in December 1964. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the three-month period began on October 3, 1963. The Appellate Division affirmed, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue(s)
Whether the three-month statute of limitations for commencing an action under Labor Law § 220(8) begins to run from the date of the Industrial Commissioner’s initial wage determination, or from the final resolution of any legal challenges to that determination, including motions for reargument or appeals.
Holding
No, because the three-month period begins to run only after a final determination is reached, including the resolution of any legal proceedings challenging the administrative wage determination. The statute aims to protect workingmen, and it would be unreasonable to require them to sue while the underlying administrative finding is still under legal attack.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized the remedial purpose of Labor Law § 220, which aims to protect workers from being underpaid. The court reasoned that requiring employees to sue while the employer challenges the wage determination would be unfair and potentially futile. The Court stated, “The terms, ‘final determination’ and ‘final order,’ in subdivision 8 of section 220 must refer to an event that puts an end to any such pending attack—whether it be the original attack in the article 78 proceeding, allowed to the employer by the statute, or a subsequently launched attack by way of a motion for reargument or an appeal.” The court noted that the “finality” of a determination depends on the employer’s actions. If the employer challenges the initial determination, the limitations period is tolled until the challenge is resolved. In this case, the Village’s motion for reargument extended the period until its denial on October 15, 1964, making the December 1964 action timely. The court also rejected the Village’s arguments regarding notice requirements, finding they did not apply to actions under § 220(8). The court remitted the matter for consideration of the summary judgment motion, finding a grant of “moot” to be inappropriate.