People v. Colascione, 22 N.Y.2d 65 (1968)
A criminal defendant is entitled to a new trial when the trial court conducts an ex parte inquiry of the jury regarding potential prejudice, admits prejudicial hearsay evidence, and improperly instructs the jury regarding the use of a co-defendant’s guilty plea.
Summary
Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion and fix prices, and related charges, stemming from a scheme to dynamite barber shops to coerce barbers into joining a guild. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial based on three significant errors: (1) the trial judge’s ex parte inquiry to the jury about a potentially prejudicial statement, (2) the admission of hearsay evidence that reconstructed the alleged conspiracy, and (3) the improper admission of a co-defendant’s guilty plea with instructions that allowed the jury to consider it as evidence against the other defendants if they found a conspiracy existed. These errors undermined the defendants’ right to a fair trial.
Facts
The defendants were accused of conspiring to dynamite barber shops in Nassau County to force dissenting barbers to join a guild that aimed to fix minimum prices. The prosecution alleged that the defendants recruited individuals from Michigan to carry out the actual dynamiting. Key evidence included the testimony of Bob Meyer, identified as a “confederate” and “key witness.” During the trial, questions arose about Meyer’s accommodations during the trial, leading to a claim that the prosecution made a prejudicial remark in the jury’s presence regarding protection for Meyer’s family.
Procedural History
The defendants were convicted after a lengthy trial. They appealed, citing numerous legal errors. The appellate division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the convictions, ordering a new trial.
Issue(s)
1. Whether an ex parte inquiry by the judge to the jury concerning a purported prejudicial statement made in their presence warrants a new trial.
2. Whether the admission of hearsay evidence on substantial issues in the case warrants a new trial.
3. Whether the acceptance of proof of a guilty plea by a co-defendant, under instructions to the jury that permitted an inference the plea could be binding on appellants as co-conspirators, warrants a new trial.
Holding
1. Yes, because the ex parte nature of the inquiry and the lack of a proper record created an unacceptable risk of prejudice.
2. Yes, because the hearsay evidence was prejudicial and bolstered the testimony of an accomplice.
3. Yes, because the instructions given to the jury were prejudicial and did not adequately limit the use of the co-defendant’s guilty plea.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals found that the trial judge’s ex parte inquiry to the jury, conducted through the court clerk without a proper record, was a departure from traditional procedure and created an unacceptable risk of prejudice. The court emphasized the importance of an adversary inquiry, under oath, to determine whether the jury heard the potentially prejudicial statement. The court cited cases such as Maurer v. People, 43 N.Y. 1 (1870) and People ex rel. Bartlam v. Murphy, 9 N.Y.2d 550 (1961), highlighting the strict adherence to protecting a defendant’s rights during jury communications.
The Court also held that the admission of hearsay evidence from a special agent, who reconstructed the conspiracy based on information from Meyer, was prejudicial. The court emphasized that this narrative, offered in a form that could be taken by the jury as factual, improperly bolstered the accomplice’s testimony. The Court cited Waldele v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. R. Co., 95 N.Y. 274; People v. Seppi, 221 N.Y. 62; People v. Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471; People v. Cioffi, 1 N.Y.2d 70. The Court stated that: “Foy was reflecting to the court and the jury what his senses perceived at the time he had tke conversation with Assistant District Attorney Levy ”. Stich a sense perception was not a material fact in issue on the guilt of defendants and thus the reception of the hearsay was erroneous”. The Court found similarly prejudicial a conversation between Arcuri and Vito as it pertained to the Hagewoods. The court stated “This called for hearsay and it was prejudicial to the objecting defendants”.
Finally, the Court found that the trial court’s instructions regarding the co-defendant’s guilty plea were insufficient to prevent prejudice. The court noted that while the plea could be admissible for assessing the witness’s credibility, it had no probative value as to the guilt of the other defendants. The court emphasized that the trial judge’s instruction left it open for the jury to consider Fusco’s plea “binding on” the appellants. The Court stated “A juror would reasonably take this to mean that if he found a conspiracy to have existed he might then, if ‘so satisfied’, find Fusco’s plea ‘binding on ‘ the appellants”.