City of Buffalo v. Magavern, 26 N.Y.2d 825 (1970)
General Municipal Law § 207-c creates an independent cause of action for municipalities to recover wages and medical expenses paid to injured employees, not subject to subrogation principles, and therefore the statute of limitations runs from the date of the municipality’s payment.
Summary
The City of Buffalo sued Magavern to recover wages and medical expenses paid to a police officer injured due to Magavern’s negligence, invoking General Municipal Law § 207-c. The lawsuit was initiated more than three years after the officer’s injury but within six years of the city’s payments. The central issue was whether the claim was time-barred, hinging on whether the city’s right was derivative (subrogation) or an independent cause of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the claim was derivative and thus time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to the underlying negligence claim. The dissent argued that § 207-c created a new cause of action for the city, with the statute of limitations running from the date of payment.
Facts
A Buffalo police officer was injured due to the alleged negligence of Magavern. The City of Buffalo paid the officer’s wages and medical expenses as required by General Municipal Law § 207-c. The City of Buffalo then commenced an action against Magavern to recover these payments.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court initially denied the motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint. The City of Buffalo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, thereby dismissing the City’s claim.
Issue(s)
Whether the cause of action created by General Municipal Law § 207-c is an independent cause of action accruing upon the city’s payment of wages and medical expenses, or whether it is a derivative claim subject to the same statute of limitations as the underlying negligence action against the tortfeasor.
Holding
No, because the city’s claim is derivative and subject to the same statute of limitations as the underlying negligence claim. The action was not timely commenced because it was initiated more than three years after the officer’s injury, which is the statute of limitations for negligence actions.
Court’s Reasoning
The majority in the Appellate Division relied on United States Cas. Co. v. North Amer. Brewing Co., 253 App. Div. 576, affd. 279 N.Y. 762. The Court held that the claim was essentially one for subrogation, meaning the city stood in the shoes of the injured officer. As such, the statute of limitations began to run from the date of the officer’s injury, not the date of the city’s payments. The dissent, however, argued that § 207-c created a new and independent cause of action for the City, distinct from the officer’s negligence claim. The dissent emphasized the differences between § 207-c and the Workmen’s Compensation Law, which contains a detailed subrogation scheme. Under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, the injured employee can either seek compensation or sue the third party. If the employee chooses compensation, the third-party action is assigned to the carrier. The dissent argued that, unlike the Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 207-c does not assign the policeman’s cause of action to the municipality. The municipality’s only interest is to recover its own expenditures, it does not act for the policeman and it owes him no duty of representation, therefore the municipality’s rights are not based upon subrogation, but on an independent right created by statute. The dissent maintained that the statute of limitations should run from the date of the city’s payment because the city’s right to recover only arises upon making those payments.