People v. Cefaro, 21 N.Y.2d 252 (1967)
A defendant does not have standing to challenge the search and seizure of evidence from another person’s property if the defendant’s own privacy rights were not violated during the search.
Summary
Defendants Cefaro, Josephs, and Russo were convicted of burglary and grand larceny. A key piece of evidence, a stolen camera, was found in the apartment of one Barth during a search for narcotics under a warrant. While the prosecution initially agreed to suppress the camera, they later successfully argued that the defendants lacked standing to challenge the search of Barth’s apartment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated since the search occurred on Barth’s property and not their own, and they were not present during the search. The Court also rejected the argument that Barth was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration.
Facts
On February 29, 1964, a burglary occurred at the premises of William Mendolia, resulting in the theft of cash, jewelry, and a Polaroid camera. On the same evening, binoculars, two television sets, and liquor were stolen from Thomas Simonetti’s apartment at the same address.
On March 2, 1964, police searched the apartment of Barth pursuant to a warrant for narcotics. During the search, the stolen Polaroid camera was found in a bureau drawer belonging to one of Barth’s children. Barth testified that the defendants brought the stolen items to his apartment and that Russo sold him the camera.
Russo admitted that he was with the other defendants on the night of the burglary and that he and Cefaro entered a house and committed a burglary. Josephs admitted to being a lookout during the burglary. Cefaro denied participating in the burglary.
Procedural History
The defendants were convicted of burglary in the third degree (two counts), grand larceny in the first degree, and grand larceny in the second degree. Prior to trial, the assistant district attorney consented to the suppression of the camera, but later successfully moved to be relieved of this consent. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the defendants lacked standing to challenge the seizure of the camera from Barth’s apartment. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions without opinion. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge that Barth was an accomplice as a matter of law or, at least, that the jury could find Barth to have been an accomplice, requiring corroboration of his testimony?
2. Whether it was improper to revoke the order suppressing the camera and whether revoking it during the trial was unfair and deprived the defendants of a fair trial?
3. Whether the refusal to charge that the jury must find the confessions were voluntary deprived the defendants of their constitutional right to trial by jury?
Holding
1. No, because the evidence indicated Barth was a receiver of stolen property, not an accomplice to the burglary and larceny.
2. No, because the defendants lacked standing to challenge the search and seizure of evidence from Barth’s apartment.
3. No, because there was no evidence presented that the confessions were involuntary, and no proper requests or exceptions were made regarding jury instructions on voluntariness (except for Josephs, whose request was declined).
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that Barth could not have been convicted of burglary or larceny based on the evidence presented. The court referenced People v. Foley, 307 N.Y. 490 and People v. Roman, 12 N.Y.2d 220, indicating that while possession of stolen goods can be evidence of larceny, the possession must be unexplained. In this case, Barth’s testimony and the statements of the defendants indicated that he was merely a receiver of stolen property, which is a mutually exclusive crime from larceny. The court cited People v. Kupperschmidt, 237 N.Y. 463, 465, stating, “The crimes of larceny and receiving are mutually exclusive.” Thus, Barth could not have been an accomplice.
Regarding the camera, the Court held that the defendants lacked standing to challenge its seizure because it was found in Barth’s apartment, not their own. The Court distinguished the case from People v. McDonnell, 18 N.Y.2d 509, where a wiretap was installed in premises maintained for the defendant’s benefit. The Court clarified that the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, did not overrule prior precedent established in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261; and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471. These cases established that a defendant cannot assert that evidence seized unlawfully from another person’s property should be suppressed. The court emphasized that if the defendants had been present in Barth’s apartment and the camera had been taken from their possession, they might have had standing to challenge its use.
The Court did not find any evidence presented demonstrating the involuntariness of the confessions and noted the appellants’ failure to properly request or except to the court’s failure to charge the jury concerning the voluntariness of these admissions.