People v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19 (1969)
A voluntary statement made by a suspect, even after a search warrant is executed but before any interrogation begins, is admissible as evidence and is not barred by the Fifth Amendment.
Summary
McKie was convicted of possessing policy slips. Police officers executed a search warrant at his apartment. Before the officers initiated any questioning, McKie volunteered the location of the contraband. McKie argued his statement was inadmissible because he was in custody and had not received Miranda warnings. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that McKie’s statement was admissible because it was voluntary and not the product of custodial interrogation. The court emphasized the distinction between voluntary statements and those obtained through interrogation, asserting that Miranda protections are triggered by interrogation, not mere custody.
Facts
On May 26, 1966, Officer Marfisi arrived at McKie’s apartment with a warrant to search both McKie and the premises.
The officer identified himself and displayed the warrant.
Before Officer Marfisi could ask any questions, McKie stated, “The booklets are in the closet in the room, on top. You are going to find them anyway.”
The officer then located paper bags containing mutuel horse race policy booklets in the designated closet.
Procedural History
McKie was convicted in the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County, for violating section 975 of the former Penal Law.
The Appellate Term, First Department, unanimously affirmed the conviction.
McKie appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging the admissibility of his statement and the sufficiency of evidence.
Issue(s)
1. Whether McKie’s statement to the police officer, made after a search warrant was exhibited but before any questioning, was admissible under Miranda v. Arizona.
2. Whether the possession of unplayed boli-pol constitutes a violation of section 975 of the former Penal Law.
Holding
1. Yes, because McKie volunteered the information before any interrogation took place, making the statement admissible despite the absence of Miranda warnings. The court emphasized the distinction between voluntary statements and those obtained through interrogation.
2. Yes, because the statute encompasses all paraphernalia commonly used for “policy,” and possession of such items, whether or not they record a placed bet, is presumptive evidence of a violation.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that the key issue was whether McKie was subjected to “custodial interrogation” when he made the statement. While acknowledging arguments that the execution of a search warrant could create a coercive environment, the court emphasized that McKie volunteered the information before any questions were asked. Referencing Miranda v. Arizona, the court reiterated that “[a]ny statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.” The court distinguished between statements obtained through interrogation and truly voluntary statements, holding that the Miranda rule only applies to the former.
The court further supported its reasoning by citing post-Miranda cases where spontaneous statements made by suspects in custody were deemed admissible. It declined to extend Miranda to situations where statements are volunteered, even in the context of a search warrant execution.
Regarding the possession of “unplayed” policy slips, the court found that the statute’s language was broad enough to encompass all paraphernalia used in the policy game, not just slips representing actual bets. The court stated the omnibus phrase of the statute, “or any paper, print, writing, policy slip, or article of any kind” used in policy, has a broader sweep. It embraces all the paraphernalia commonly used for “policy”; and possession of such items, whether or not they record the fact that a bet has been placed, is presumptive evidence of violation of the statute (see People v. Kravitz, 287 N. Y. 475, 477-478, revg. 262 App. Div. 911, 912 [violation of § 975 grounded on possession of unsold lottery slips]; Ann. Possession of Gambling Device as Crime, 162 ALR 1188, 1189-1191; cf. People v. Lalli, 5 Y 2d 536, 539; but see, contra, People v. Rodriguez, 49 Misc 2d 324).