People v. Harrington, 21 N.Y.2d 61 (1967)

A court lacks the power to increase a defendant’s sentence upon resentencing when the original sentence was vacated solely due to a clerical error in recording the crime of conviction, especially after imprisonment has commenced.

Summary

Harrington pleaded guilty to robbery and received a sentence. This sentence was later found defective due to a clerical error in the minutes. Upon resentencing, Harrington received a longer sentence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the resentencing court lacked the power to increase the sentence because the original defect was merely a clerical error, not a substantive flaw in the sentencing process itself. The court emphasized that once imprisonment begins under a validly imposed sentence, the court’s power to vacate that sentence is limited, especially when the defect is purely ministerial.

Facts

In 1947, Harrington pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree robbery and was initially sentenced as a second felony offender.
He was resentenced in 1953 as a first offender.
In 1954, after a habeas corpus proceeding, he was resentenced again to 20 to 40 years.
In 1964, this sentence was deemed defective because the court minutes failed to state the crime of which he was convicted, as required by Section 485 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
On November 10, 1964, Harrington was resentenced nunc pro tunc to consecutive terms totaling 30 to 80 years.

Procedural History

The Appellate Division modified the 1964 resentence, reducing it to 25 to 50 years, finding the original sentence excessive.
Harrington appealed, arguing that his sentence should not exceed the 20 to 40 years imposed in 1954.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision regarding the resentencing.

Issue(s)

Whether a court has the power to increase a defendant’s sentence upon resentencing when the original sentence was vacated solely because of a ministerial error (failure to record the crime of conviction in the clerk’s minutes), after the defendant has begun serving the original sentence.

Holding

No, because the defect in the original sentence was merely a clerical error and not a substantive flaw in the sentencing process. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and reinstated the 1954 sentence of 20 to 40 years.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the omission in the clerk’s minutes was a ministerial error, correctable by referencing the indictment, charge, and jury verdict. The court relied on prior case law (People ex rel. Harris v. Lindsay) establishing that irregularities in commitment proceedings are not grounds for discharge if a valid judgment of conviction underlies the commitment.

The court distinguished this situation from cases where the sentence was vacated due to an illegal term of imprisonment or a change in the defendant’s status as a multiple felony offender. In those cases, the resentencing court has broader discretion to impose a different sentence.

Here, the sentencing judge was already familiar with the record and provided the defendant an opportunity to be heard; the only defect was the clerk’s failure to record the offense. Once imprisonment began, the court lacked the power to vacate the sentence for such a minor error.

The Court cited People v. Bradner: “The entry in this case does not fully conform to section 485, as it contains no statement of the offense of which the defendant was convicted. Looking at the whole record, which includes the indictment and the minutes of the trial, the fact appears. The question is whether this omission in the entry by the clerk makes the sentence void… or may the other parts of the record be referred to… and may this court conform the entry to the fact.” The court in Bradner held that the defect was amendable and that the judgment should be amended to include a statement of the offense.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that the proper remedy was to amend the clerk’s minutes, not to resentence the defendant to a longer term. Vacating the original sentence and imposing a harsher one was beyond the court’s power under these circumstances.