People v. Diaz, 19 N.Y.2d 547 (1967)
A conviction cannot stand solely on the testimony of an accomplice, including a codefendant testifying in their own defense, unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence connecting the defendant to the crime.
Summary
Diaz and Green were charged with grand larceny and related crimes. At trial, Green, a codefendant, testified against Diaz, implicating him in the crime. The trial court refused to instruct the jury that Green’s testimony required corroboration, believing it unnecessary when the accomplice is a codefendant. The Appellate Division agreed this was error, but deemed it harmless. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the jury should have been instructed on the need for corroboration of accomplice testimony, regardless of whether the accomplice is a codefendant, and that the error was not harmless because the jury’s verdict may have relied heavily on Green’s uncorroborated testimony.
Facts
Police officers observed Diaz driving a car pushing another car, which was later identified as stolen, with Green behind the wheel of the stolen vehicle. As the officers approached, Green fled. Diaz drove off. Green testified against Diaz at trial, detailing Diaz’s involvement in the crime and identifying a transmission in Diaz’s car as belonging to the stolen vehicle.
Procedural History
Diaz was convicted of concealing and withholding stolen property. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, acknowledging that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury about the need for corroboration of accomplice testimony, but held the error harmless. Diaz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a conviction can be upheld when based on the uncorroborated testimony of a codefendant implicating the defendant in the commission of a crime, where the trial court failed to instruct the jury that accomplice testimony requires corroboration under Section 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Holding
No, because Section 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates corroboration of accomplice testimony, and this requirement applies regardless of whether the accomplice is a codefendant testifying in their own defense; therefore, the failure to so instruct the jury was prejudicial error.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized the plain language of Section 399, which states, “A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless he be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.” The court found no basis in the statute to distinguish between an accomplice who is merely a witness and one who is a codefendant testifying in their own behalf. The court noted that the jury might have relied heavily on Green’s testimony, particularly regarding the transmission, which was a key piece of evidence. The court reasoned that, despite the existence of other evidence, the jury could have discredited that evidence, leaving Green’s uncorroborated testimony as the primary basis for the conviction. Quoting People v. Wallin, 32 Cal. 2d 803, 809, the court stated: “‘Although there was evidence which, if believed, was corroborative of the testimony of [the accomplice], defendant was clearly prejudiced by the refusal to give the requested instructions, since the jury in considering the credibility of witnesses may have rejected the corrobative evidence leaving the testimony of the accomplice to stand alone.’” The court also addressed the argument that a codefendant might be less likely to seek leniency by implicating another, stating that the District Attorney’s office could still have offered a lighter sentence to Green in exchange for his testimony against Diaz. Therefore, the court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, emphasizing the importance of instructing the jury on the need for corroboration of accomplice testimony to ensure a fair trial.