Sanitation Men Ass’n. v. Sanitation Com’r of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 280 (1968)
The Equal Protection Clause is violated when a facially valid statute is applied in a discriminatory manner due to intentional or purposeful discrimination, not mere non-enforcement against other violators.
Summary
This case concerns whether the selective enforcement of New York’s Condon-Wadlin Act (prohibiting strikes by public employees) against a union of ferryboat officers violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court found that while the Act’s penalties had rarely been enforced, the union needed to demonstrate intentional and invidious discrimination in its enforcement, not just that others had gone unpunished. The case was remitted to the lower court for a hearing to determine if such intentional discrimination existed.
Facts
Over 100 ferryboat officers, employed by the City of New York, were found to have engaged in a strike in violation of Section 108 of the Civil Service Law (the Condon-Wadlin Act). The Commissioner of Marine and Aviation imposed penalties, including loss of pay, demotion, and part-time re-employment. The ferryboat officers challenged this determination, arguing that the Condon-Wadlin Act was unconstitutional and that its enforcement against them was discriminatory.
Procedural History
The ferryboat officers initiated an Article 78 proceeding to review the Commissioner’s determination. The Supreme Court, New York County, transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division, First Department. The Appellate Division confirmed the Commissioner’s determination without opinion. The ferryboat officers then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the application of the Condon-Wadlin Act to the ferryboat officers, when the Act was rarely enforced against other striking public employees, constituted a denial of equal protection under the law.
Holding
No, because to establish an equal protection violation based on selective enforcement, the ferryboat officers must demonstrate that the enforcement against them was the result of intentional and purposeful discrimination, not merely that the statute was not enforced against others similarly situated.
Court’s Reasoning
The court addressed the union’s argument that the selective enforcement of the Condon-Wadlin Act violated the Equal Protection Clause, citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins. However, the court distinguished Yick Wo, emphasizing that the Supreme Court has refined the test for equal protection violations to require a showing of “intentional or purposeful discrimination.” The court stated, “[T]he unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.”
The court acknowledged that the Condon-Wadlin Act had rarely been enforced over a 20-year period, despite numerous strikes by public employees. However, the court stated that this mere nonenforcement was insufficient to prove an equal protection violation. Quoting Oyler v. Boles, the court noted that “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation” unless the selection was based on an unjustifiable standard like race or religion.
The court found that the union had not been afforded an opportunity to factually demonstrate such intentional and purposeful discrimination. There were factual issues requiring a hearing, such as the department’s actual motivation and the reasons for the lack of enforcement against others. The court concluded that an opportunity was required to properly determine the scope of the union’s constitutional rights and any violation thereof. The court specifically noted, “Petitioners have had no forum at which they could attempt to factually demonstrate such intentional and purposeful discrimination. And there are many factual issues requiring such a hearing: the actual motivation of the department (to comply with the law, or perhaps to favor one union over another, etc.); the actual responsibility for the decision to apply Condon-Wadlin…; the reasons for lack of enforcement against others similarly situated (mere strength of bargaining power or reasonable selectivity properly motivated), etc.”