People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66 (1967): Standing to Challenge a Wiretap

People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66 (1967)

A defendant has standing to challenge the validity of a wiretap and subsequent search if the defendant’s own privacy was violated, but not merely because evidence obtained from the violation of another person’s rights incriminates the defendant.

Summary

Morhouse was convicted of conspiracy based on evidence obtained from a wiretap on a phone not belonging to him and a search of premises he did not own. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether Morhouse had standing to challenge the legality of the wiretap and search. The court held that a defendant has standing only when their own privacy rights have been violated, not when evidence against them is derived from violations of another’s rights. Because Morhouse failed to demonstrate a violation of his own privacy, the court held that he lacked standing to challenge the wiretap and search.

Facts

The essential facts are that evidence used to convict Morhouse of conspiracy was obtained from:
1. A wiretap on a telephone that was not owned by Morhouse.
2. A search of premises not owned by Morhouse.
Morhouse was charged with conspiring with the owners of the phone and the possessors of the searched apartment. Morhouse challenged the validity of the wiretap and the subsequent search, arguing that they were unlawful.

Procedural History

The District Court convicted Morhouse. The defendant appealed, arguing he had standing to challenge the legality of the wiretap. The Court of Appeals withheld determination of the appeal and remitted the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Issue(s)

Whether a defendant has standing to challenge the validity of a wiretap or search when the defendant’s own privacy was not invaded, but the evidence obtained from the wiretap or search is used against them in a conspiracy charge?

Holding

No, because the right to privacy is personal, and a defendant cannot complain merely because the violation of another person’s right reveals evidence incriminating them.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the essence of the Fourth Amendment is privacy and that the exclusion of evidence is a means to secure that privacy. Citing Jones v. United States, the court emphasized that restrictions on searches and seizures are for protection against official invasion of privacy. The court stated that “ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search * * * that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy.” The court distinguished Jones v. United States, noting that in Jones, the defendant was required to assert possession of the contraband to establish standing, which would force him to confess to the crime. Also, the defendant in Jones had a sufficient interest in the premises searched to claim a right of privacy. In Morhouse, the court found that Morhouse did not claim ownership of the phone tapped or the premises searched, nor could he. The court noted that Morhouse’s primary concern was to avoid any contact with the phone or premises. The court concluded that Morhouse was merely a “user” of the phone, which was insufficient to establish standing under the rationale of Jones. The dissenting opinion argued that Morhouse lacked standing because his privacy was not invaded. The dissent emphasized that the fact that the wiretap revealed Morhouse’s participation in the conspiracy did not, in itself, give Morhouse standing to challenge the wiretap.