People v. Gunner, 21 N.Y.2d 891 (1968)
The rule established in People v. Waterman and Massiah v. United States, concerning the admissibility of post-indictment statements obtained without counsel, is not retroactively applicable.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals considered whether the rule preventing the admission of post-indictment statements obtained without the presence of counsel, as established in People v. Waterman and Massiah v. United States, should be applied retroactively. The court, in affirming the Appellate Division’s judgment, held that the Waterman-Massiah rule should not be applied retroactively, aligning its policy considerations with those used in determining the retroactivity of Miranda v. Arizona.
Facts
The facts of the underlying criminal case are not detailed in this decision, as the focus is solely on the retroactivity of a legal rule. The key fact is that the defendant’s post-indictment statement was admitted at trial without objection. The appeal hinges on whether the principles of Waterman and Massiah should apply to this case, even though the trial occurred before those decisions were rendered.
Procedural History
The case initially proceeded through a trial where the defendant’s post-indictment statement was admitted. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appeal to the New York Court of Appeals specifically addressed the question of whether the Waterman-Massiah rule should be applied retroactively to this case.
Issue(s)
Whether the rule established in People v. Waterman and Massiah v. United States, prohibiting the admission of post-indictment statements obtained without counsel present, should be applied retroactively to cases already tried when those decisions were rendered.
Holding
No, because the considerations for applying the Waterman-Massiah rule retroactively are similar to those considered for Miranda v. Arizona, which the Supreme Court determined should not be applied retroactively.
Court’s Reasoning
The court, in a concurring opinion by Judge Keating, reasoned that the retroactivity of the Waterman-Massiah rule should be determined by similar policy considerations used by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. New Jersey when deciding the retroactivity of Miranda v. Arizona. The court noted that the Waterman-Massiah rule is similar in purpose and effect to the Miranda rule. Judge Keating stated, “If it is determined for reasons of policy that the change in the law effectuated by Waterman and Massiah should be given retroactive effect then the fact that the defendant failed to make a useless objection should be of no consequence.” However, because the court believed the rules were similar, it determined that the Waterman-Massiah rule should not be applied retroactively, citing United States v. Fay. The court did not fully detail the underlying policy considerations, but alluded to the disruption that retroactive application could cause to past convictions. The practical effect of this decision is that convictions obtained before the Waterman and Massiah decisions, where post-indictment statements were admitted, would not be automatically overturned. This case highlights the balancing act courts undertake when deciding whether to apply new legal rules to past cases, weighing the fairness to individual defendants against the potential disruption to the legal system.