People v. Gittelson, 18 N.Y.2d 427 (1966)

A sentence that includes a fine and an alternative prison term for non-payment does not violate equal protection or due process rights if the defendant has the means to pay the fine, and sentencing judges can consider factors beyond the specific crime committed, including related conduct and character, as long as they don’t coerce further testimony.

Summary

Gittelson, president of a public relations firm, was convicted of perjury after lying to a grand jury investigating bribery allegations. He was sentenced to a year in prison and a $50,000 fine, with an additional five years imprisonment if he failed to pay. Gittelson appealed, arguing the sentence was unduly harsh and violated his rights because an indigent defendant would be imprisoned while a wealthy one would pay the fine. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, holding that since Gittelson paid the fine, the equal protection argument was moot. The court also found the sentencing judge properly considered Gittelson’s related conduct (defrauding a company and obstructing justice) in addition to the perjury itself, and that the sentence did not constitute an attempt to coerce further testimony.

Facts

Gittelson, representing a parking meter company, told its officers that $50,000 was needed to improve relations with city officials who would influence the purchase of parking meters. The company provided the money. Suspicions arose, and a grand jury investigated. Gittelson, granted immunity, lied to the grand jury about the disposition of the $50,000.

Procedural History

Gittelson was indicted on 27 counts of perjury and pleaded guilty to 10. The trial court sentenced him to one year on each count (concurrently) and a $5,000 fine on each count (consecutively), with a six-month alternative sentence for each unpaid fine. The Appellate Division affirmed the sentence. Gittelson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals with permission from a dissenting Justice.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a sentence including a fine with an alternative prison term violates the Equal Protection Clause when a defendant claims indigence.

2. Whether the sentencing court’s consideration of factors beyond the specific crime of perjury, including related conduct, violated the defendant’s Due Process rights.

Holding

1. No, because Gittelson paid the fine, the question of whether an alternative sentence is an invalid discrimination between those who can pay and those who cannot is moot.

2. No, because the sentencing judge properly considered factors beyond the specific crime, and the sentence was not an attempt to coerce further testimony.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that because Gittelson paid the $50,000 fine, his equal protection argument based on indigence was invalid. It cited Wildeblood v. United States, stating that the case did not involve “’the question whether an alternative sentence or imprisonment is an invalid discrimination between those who are able to pay and those who are not.’” The court distinguished People v. Saffore, where the defendant was genuinely indigent and the alternative sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.

Regarding due process, the court emphasized that sentencing judges can consider factors beyond the specific acts of the crime. Quoting Pennsylvania v. Ashe, “’justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.’” The court found Gittelson’s actions defrauding the corporation and obstructing the grand jury investigation were relevant considerations. The court also addressed Gittelson’s claim that the sentence was meant to coerce further testimony, citing the Appellate Division’s point that the trial court had the power to remit the fine if Gittelson cooperated or proved his inability to provide further information.