Durham v. Metropolitan Electric Protective Association, 27 N.Y.2d 434 (1971)
When a regulation designed to maximize safety is violated, and that violation increases the difficulty and risk of performing a task, it is a question of fact for the jury whether the violation proximately caused an injury sustained while performing that task.
Summary
James Durham, a window washer, sued Metropolitan Electric Protective Association for negligence after falling from a first-story window. Durham alleged that the company failed to maintain a proper anchor and violated Labor Law § 202 and the Industrial Code, specifically regarding the minimum unobstructed passage of 30 inches from the window sill. The company had placed blocks, restricting the window opening to 26 inches. Durham fell while trying to attach his safety belt to the anchor. The trial court submitted the case to the jury, which found for Durham. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence of proximate cause. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the issue of proximate cause was a factual question for the jury.
Facts
James Durham, a window washer, was employed to clean windows at Metropolitan Electric Protective Association’s premises.
The window he was cleaning had a safety anchor 51 inches above the sill, compliant with Industrial Code Rule 21.10.
Metropolitan Electric had placed wooden blocks on the window frame, restricting the opening to 26 inches, less than the required 30 inches under Industrial Code Rule 21.6.
Durham testified that he could not reach the anchor due to the restricted opening, lost his balance while trying, and fell.
A nail protruded from the window frame 8 ½ inches below the anchor, with scuff marks found on it after the accident.
Procedural History
Durham sued Metropolitan Electric in the trial court, alleging negligence.
The trial court submitted the case to the jury, which found in favor of Durham.
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the violation of the Industrial Code was the proximate cause of the accident.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.
Issue(s)
Whether the restricted window opening, violating the Industrial Code, could be considered by a jury as the proximate cause of Durham’s injuries when he fell while trying to reach the safety anchor.
Holding
Yes, because the Industrial Code’s requirements regulating window openings and anchor heights are interrelated to maximize safety, and it is a factual question for the jury whether the violation of the window opening requirement was the proximate cause of the window washer’s fall when attempting to reach the anchor.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that the Industrial Code’s requirements for window openings and anchor heights are designed to maximize safety and minimize risks for window washers. The court stated: “All are obviously intended to maximize safety and minimize risks in an inherently perilous undertaking. If window openings do not meet requirements, anchor heights will be equally off in terms of what is required for safe operations.”
When the window opening is smaller than required, it increases the difficulty and risk of reaching the anchor. As Durham had to “attempt contortions and manipulations in order to reach an anchor,” the court found it was within the province of the jury to determine whether the lack of the extra 4 inches would have made a difference. The court concluded that the Appellate Division erred in reversing the jury’s verdict as a matter of law.
The court also noted the presence of a nail protruding from the window frame as a potential dangerous condition, but reserved judgment on the defendant’s liability as a tenant, as the record lacked information on the extent of the defendant’s control over the building.
The dissent in the Appellate Division argued that the evidence presented a factual question on the issue of proximate cause, a position the Court of Appeals agreed with.