People v. Talerico, 27 N.Y.2d 231 (1970)
A state statute may prohibit the sale of materials obscene to minors without violating the First Amendment, even if it doesn’t require proof that the seller knew the buyer was a minor, so long as the seller had knowledge of the obscene nature of the material.
Summary
Talerico was convicted under a New York law for selling pornographic material to a minor. He argued the law was unconstitutionally vague and violated the First Amendment because it didn’t require proof he knew the buyer was a minor. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, reasoning that the statute clearly defined prohibited material, required knowledge of the material’s obscene nature, and that imposing strict liability for age was a reasonable means to protect minors, not an unconstitutional burden on free speech.
Facts
A 17-year-old, working with “Operation Yorkville,” bought two “girlie” magazines from Talerico’s cigar store. The magazines, titled “Candid,” featured sexually explicit content and were marketed as sexually stimulating. The magazine cover stated, “Sale To Minors Forbidden.” Talerico sold the magazines to the minor after looking at them and pricing them.
Procedural History
Talerico was convicted under Section 484-i of the Penal Law for selling pornographic material to a minor. He appealed, arguing the statute was unconstitutional. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, upholding the statute’s validity.
Issue(s)
1. Whether Section 484-i of the New York Penal Law is unconstitutionally vague, violating due process?
2. Whether the statute’s failure to require proof of scienter (knowledge) regarding the purchaser’s age violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Holding
1. No, because the statute provides reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt readily determinable by men of reasonable intelligence.
2. No, because imposing strict liability for the sale of obscene material to minors, after establishing scienter of the material’s obscenity, is a reasonable regulation and doesn’t unduly restrict free speech.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that Section 484-i clearly defines the type of material it prohibits, focusing on material “posed or presented in such a manner as to exploit lust for commercial gain” and appealing to the lust or sexual curiosity of minors. This excludes legitimate works of art or educational texts. The court emphasized that the statute requires knowledge of the material’s obscene character, satisfying the Smith v. California standard. The court distinguished between requiring knowledge of the material’s content and requiring knowledge of the purchaser’s age. Imposing strict liability for age, the court reasoned, doesn’t unduly burden free speech because it only requires sellers to inquire about age in doubtful cases, a far less onerous burden than requiring them to inspect every piece of material they sell. The court quoted Smith v. California, stating, “The question then is not one of absolutes—it is one of reasonableness in relation to the legitimate end to be obtained. We think the burden of the statute neither unduly restricts dissemination of protected matter nor unduly inhibits receipt by those who are constitutionally entitled to receipt.” The court concluded that protecting minors from obscenity is a legitimate state interest, and the statute’s method is reasonably tailored to achieve that goal without unduly infringing on First Amendment rights. The court referenced Ginzburg v. United States, noting that the accused publications were openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers.