Matter of City of New York, 19 N.Y.2d 742 (1967)
When a statute’s interpretation is not previously addressed in lower courts, the Court of Appeals is generally disinclined to interpret it in the first instance, especially when dealing with a motion to amend the remittitur.
Summary
This case concerns a motion to amend the remittitur regarding partial payment to claimants in a condemnation proceeding. The dissenting judges argued that the Court of Appeals should not interpret a statute (Administrative Code, § B15-21.0) which hadn’t been considered by the lower courts, particularly on a motion to amend the remittitur. They read the statute as prohibiting partial decrees. Furthermore, the dissent found no evidence of arbitrary delay by the city in making just compensation, considering the ongoing appeals by both parties. The majority, however, granted the motion to amend the remittitur.
Facts
The City of New York condemned property, leading to a dispute over payment to the claimants. The taking occurred four years prior to this motion. Both the claimants and the city had appealed to higher courts. The cross-appeals were argued in February 1966 and decided in July 1966 by the Court of Appeals.
Procedural History
The case began in Special Term. Claimants sought partial payment. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals initially ruled on the case (18 N.Y.2d 212). Claimants then filed a motion to amend the remittitur to address the issue of partial payment. The motion to amend the remittitur is the subject of this decision.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the Court of Appeals should interpret a statute that has not been passed upon in the courts below, specifically on a motion to amend the remittitur?
2. Whether Administrative Code, § B15-21.0 prohibits the entry of a partial decree in condemnation proceedings?
Holding
1. The majority implicitly held yes, the court can interpret the statute at this stage because the motion to amend the remittitur was granted.
2. The majority implicitly held no, the statute does not prohibit the entry of a partial decree, because the motion to amend the remittitur was granted which would allow for partial payment.
Court’s Reasoning
The majority’s reasoning is not explicitly stated in the memorandum. The dissent argued that the Court of Appeals should not interpret a statute not previously considered by lower courts, especially on a motion to amend. The dissent interpreted Administrative Code § B15-21.0 as prohibiting partial decrees, pointing out the statute concerns real property and the enabling law adopts similar procedure. The dissent also found no basis for inferring arbitrary delay by the city, considering the ongoing appeals. They noted claimants receive constitutional compensation through interest payments for any delay. The dissent believed the request for partial payment should be addressed to the Special Term’s discretion. Chief Judge Desmond and Judges Bregan and Keating dissented arguing that the motion should not be decided without adequate consideration of the important questions presented, and the issues should be set down for oral argument. The majority, however, summarily granted the motion, suggesting a differing interpretation or a belief that the statute did not bar partial payment in this specific context. The decision underscores the court’s power to address statutory interpretation even at the remittitur stage, though the dissent raises valid concerns about procedural fairness and the importance of lower court review first.