17 N.Y.2d 286 (1966)
A publication is libelous per se if it is defamatory on its face when considered in light of facts presumably known to the community, even if those facts are not explicitly stated in the publication itself.
Summary
This case concerns a newspaper announcement of an engagement between two individuals who were, in fact, already married to others. The New York Court of Appeals held that the publication was libelous per se, meaning it was defamatory on its face without needing proof of special damages. The court reasoned that the announcement, when considered in light of the extrinsic fact that the individuals were already married, imputed a violation of marital morality and exposed them to ridicule and disgrace in their community.
Facts
The defendant newspaper published an announcement stating that Robert W. Hinsdale and Concetta Kay Rieber were engaged to be married. However, both Hinsdale and Rieber were already married to other people. Hinsdale lived and worked in Newburgh, New York, where the newspaper also circulated. Rieber also worked in Newburgh and lived nearby. The plaintiffs sued for libel, alleging the publication damaged their reputations and caused them public disgrace.
Procedural History
The lower court dismissed the complaints, finding that the article was not libelous per se because it required reference to the extrinsic fact that both individuals were already married. Since no special damages were pleaded, the case was dismissed. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether a newspaper announcement of an engagement between two people, who are in fact already married to others, constitutes libel per se, even if the announcement itself does not state that they are married.
Holding
Yes, because the announcement, when considered in light of the extrinsic fact that the individuals were already married, imputes a violation of marital morality and exposes them to ridicule and disgrace, thus constituting libel per se.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the published announcement was libelous per se. The court distinguished this case from situations where an innuendo is required to give defamatory meaning to the published words. Instead, the court relied on a line of cases, including Sydney v. Macfadden Newspaper Publishing Corp., 242 N.Y. 208 (1926), which held that extrinsic facts known to the community can be considered when determining whether a publication is libelous per se.
The court reasoned that to announce an engagement of two already married persons who work in the same area would normally cause a local scandal. The court stated: “This announcement amounted, therefore, to a written accusation which tended to hold plaintiffs up to ‘ridicule, contempt, shame, disgrace or obloquy, to degrade [them] in the estimation of the community, * * * to diminish [their] respectability’”.
The court addressed the defendant’s argument that the libel was not per se but per quod, requiring special damages, because the article needed the allegation of existing facts. The court stated that the case of O’Connell v. Press Pub. Co., 214 N.Y. 352 (1915) was distinguishable, as that case involved an effort to give defamatory meaning to the published words by ascribing to them an unnatural and unreasonable innuendo or ascribed meaning. The court found that in this case, the fact of marriage was a fact that could be considered by a jury to determine if the article was libelous per se.
The court emphasized that printed material, due to its relative permanency, is more readily held to be defamatory per se than oral statements. Therefore, they concluded that the publication was libelous per se and that a jury should determine the appropriate damages.