Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218 (1954)
A former husband’s obligation to pay alimony to his former wife, which terminated upon her remarriage, is not revived even if the remarriage is later declared void, provided the wife has a statutory right to seek support from her second, albeit invalid, marriage partner.
Summary
This case addresses whether a husband’s alimony obligations to his ex-wife are reinstated after her subsequent marriage is declared void. The separation agreement stipulated alimony would cease upon the wife’s remarriage. When the wife’s second marriage was annulled, she sought to revive her ex-husband’s alimony payments. The court held that because New York law (Domestic Relations Law § 236) allows a court in an annulment action to order the second husband to support the wife, the first husband’s obligation remains terminated. The rationale hinges on the policy consideration that the wife has an avenue for support from her second “husband,” thus negating the need to revive the first husband’s duty.
Facts
Mr. Gaines and Ms. Jacobsen entered into a separation agreement where Mr. Gaines agreed to pay alimony until Ms. Jacobsen remarried. Ms. Jacobsen subsequently remarried, and Mr. Gaines ceased alimony payments. The second marriage was later annulled because Ms. Jacobsen’s second husband had a living wife at the time of the marriage. Ms. Jacobsen then sought to reinstate alimony payments from Mr. Gaines.
Procedural History
The trial court ruled in favor of Ms. Jacobsen, reinstating Mr. Gaines’ alimony obligation. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the annulment of the second marriage did not revive Mr. Gaines’ alimony obligation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.
Issue(s)
Whether a former husband’s obligation to pay alimony to his former wife, which terminated upon her remarriage, is revived when the remarriage is subsequently annulled.
Holding
No, because New York Domestic Relations Law § 236 allows a court, in an annulment action, to direct the husband to provide support for the wife, eliminating the need to revive the prior husband’s obligation.
Court’s Reasoning
The court distinguished this case from its prior decision in Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366 (1929), where alimony was reinstated after the annulment of a subsequent marriage. The critical difference was the enactment of Civil Practice Act § 1140-a (now Domestic Relations Law § 236) between the two decisions. This statute empowers courts to order support for a wife in an annulment action. The court reasoned that because the wife now has a legal avenue to seek support from her second husband (even if the marriage was void), the need to revive the first husband’s obligation is eliminated. The court stated, “Today, through the operation of section 1140-a, the wife can receive support from the husband of the annulled marriage, where ‘justice requires,’ and there is no more reason to revive the obligation of the first husband—a stranger to the annulment—than there would be if the marriage were terminated by divorce.” The court emphasized the policy consideration that the law should avoid imposing a double burden on the first husband when the wife has recourse for support from her second marriage. This decision effectively limits Sleicher to situations where the wife has no statutory right to support from the annulled marriage partner. The dissenting opinion argued that because in this specific case the second husband had died after commencement of the litigation, section 1140-a would be of no avail to the wife, and therefore the holding in Sleicher should control.