People v. Graham, 25 N.Y.2d 172 (1969)
Evidence obtained as a direct result of questioning a suspect after their attorney has instructed the police not to interrogate them in the absence of counsel is inadmissible, as is any derivative evidence obtained as a result of that questioning.
Summary
Graham was convicted of second-degree murder, but the Appellate Division reversed, citing the admission of a statement taken at the police station after Graham’s law firm contacted the police. The Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal, holding that the misleading answer given by the Chief of Detectives that there was nothing wrong and no need for a lawyer nullified the law firm’s communication and therefore the statement was inadmissible. The court also addressed issues raised by the defendant regarding admissibility of other evidence and the permissible scope of retrial.
Facts
Maxwell Slick was killed. Graham was indicted for second-degree murder and convicted of first-degree manslaughter. Prior to making a statement to the police, Graham’s law firm had contacted the police. The Chief of Detectives gave a misleading answer that “there was nothing wrong and no need for a lawyer.” In his statement, Graham revealed where he threw the murder weapon. The gun was retrieved from the river at the location described in Graham’s statement.
Prior to the killing, a conversation occurred between Graham and his wife in the presence of Maxwell Slick.
Procedural History
The trial court convicted Graham of first-degree manslaughter based on an indictment for second-degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that a statement by Graham was improperly admitted into evidence. Both the People and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the statement taken from Graham at the police station should have been excluded from evidence.
2. Whether the gun, retrieved as a result of Graham’s statement, should be excluded from evidence.
3. Whether the conversation between Graham and his wife in the presence of the victim is admissible as evidence.
4. Whether, upon retrial, Graham can be tried on a charge more serious than manslaughter in the first degree.
Holding
1. No, because the misleading answer given by the Chief of Detectives threw defense counsel off guard, and the consequence is the same as though the police had been instructed by an attorney for defendant that he was not to be interrogated in the absence of counsel.
2. Yes, because the gun’s retrieval was traced directly to the inadmissible statement, unless retrieval can be linked to another independent source.
3. Yes, because the privilege protecting marital communications does not apply when a third person is present.
4. No, because to retry Graham on a more serious charge than manslaughter in the first degree would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that the misleading answer by the Chief of Detectives had the same effect as if the police had been explicitly instructed not to interrogate Graham without his attorney present, citing People v. Gunner, People v. Donovan, and People v. Sanchez. Therefore, the statement was inadmissible.
The court applied the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, holding that the gun, located as a result of the inadmissible statement, was also inadmissible unless it could be linked to an independent source, citing Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States.
The court noted that marital privilege does not apply when a third person is present, citing People v. Daghita, People v. Melski, and People v. McCormack.
The court then addressed the double jeopardy issue. Although New York’s Criminal Procedure Code had previously allowed retrial on a greater charge after a conviction on a lesser charge was overturned on appeal (People v. Palmer, People v. McGrath, People v. Ercole, Matter of Fiorillo v. Farrell), the Supreme Court case of Green v. United States established a different rule for federal courts, holding that retrying a defendant for a greater offense after a conviction on a lesser offense violates the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy. The court acknowledged that the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extended the Green rule to the states. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hetenyi, the court concluded that subsequent Supreme Court decisions such as Malloy v. Hogan, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., and Pointer v. Texas supported the Second Circuit’s conclusion. Therefore, the court held that Graham could not be retried on a charge greater than manslaughter in the first degree.