16 N.Y.2d 32 (1965)
A short-form indictment is sufficient if it informs the defendant of the crime charged with enough detail to allow preparation for trial and to prevent double jeopardy, particularly when supplemented by a bill of particulars if requested.
Summary
Langford appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that the short-form indictment used was insufficient because it did not name the victim. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, finding the indictment sufficient because Langford could have requested a bill of particulars to obtain more specific information about the charge. The court reasoned that the purpose of the short-form indictment is to simplify the process while still protecting the defendant’s rights, and that the availability of a bill of particulars ensures adequate notice and prevents later retrials for the same crime. However, the court remitted the case for a hearing on the voluntariness of Langford’s confession.
Facts
Langford was indicted for second-degree murder. The indictment, drafted in a short-form manner, stated that on or about January 25, 1961, in Suffolk County, he committed the crime of Murder in the Second Degree, contrary to Penal Law, Section 1046. The indictment did not name the victim. Langford was arrested based on information charging him with the murder of Leonora Johnson Langford. At trial, a statement was introduced as part of the People’s case.
Procedural History
Langford was convicted of second-degree murder. He appealed, arguing that the indictment was insufficient because it did not name the victim. The appellate court considered the sufficiency of the indictment under New York law. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment to direct a hearing on the voluntariness of Langford’s confession, remitting the case to the County Court for that purpose, and otherwise affirmed the conviction.
Issue(s)
Whether a short-form indictment for murder in the second degree is sufficient when it does not name the victim, provided the defendant has the opportunity to request a bill of particulars for further details.
Holding
Yes, because the short-form indictment, coupled with the availability of a bill of particulars, provides sufficient notice to the defendant and protects against double jeopardy.
Court’s Reasoning
The court relied on sections 295-a through 295-l of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorize the short-form indictment. It cited People v. Bogdanoff, which upheld the short-form indictment. The court noted that section 295-g provides that the defendant can request a bill of particulars, and ensuing sections cover the contents and form of the bill. The legislative intent was to allow the bill of particulars to supply necessary details, enabling the defendant to prepare for trial and preventing double jeopardy, especially in cases where the defendant pleads guilty.
The court acknowledged the constitutional requirement that a Grand Jury must indict a person for infamous crimes. The court cited People v. Berkowitz, which held that the simplified indictment form cannot be used when the District Attorney is uncertain of the crime or facts but can be used where the evidence leaves no doubt of the crime and facts. Here, Langford did not demand a bill of particulars or inspect the Grand Jury minutes, so the court assumed the indictment matched the evidence at trial. The court stated: “The Bogdanoff (supra) and other decisions mean that unless a defendant demands a bill of particulars, in which event only is a bill of particulars required to be furnished unless the Trial Judge of his own motion so orders, it is to be assumed that the crime charged by the Grand Jury is the same as that disclosed by the People’s evidence at the trial.”
The court also noted that Langford was initially arrested based on information that named the victim as Leonora Johnson Langford. Finding no merit in the other points raised by Langford, the court ordered a People v. Huntley hearing to determine the voluntariness of Langford’s confession.