People v. Weisfeld, 20 N.Y.2d 411 (1967)
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A statute prohibiting the sale to minors of books that exploit or are principally made up of descriptions of illicit sex or sexual immorality is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, violating freedom of speech and due process.
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Summary
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Defendants were convicted under Penal Law § 484-h for selling “Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” (“Fanny Hill”) to a minor. The statute prohibited selling to minors books that exploit, are devoted to, or principally made up of descriptions of illicit sex or sexual immorality. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The court reasoned that the statute, by not requiring obscenity or any tendency to incite immoral acts, could be interpreted to ban a wide range of literature, thus infringing on protected speech and violating due process by failing to provide clear standards of guilt.
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Facts
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The defendants were convicted of selling a copy of the book “Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” (“Fanny Hill”) to a minor under 18 years of age.
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Procedural History
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The defendants were convicted in the trial court. They appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and dismissed the information.
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Issue(s)
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Whether Penal Law § 484-h, which prohibits the sale to minors of books that exploit, are devoted to, or are principally made up of descriptions of illicit sex or sexual immorality, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Holding
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No, because the statute’s language is either too vague to provide adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited or, if interpreted narrowly, it would unconstitutionally prohibit a wide range of protected speech.
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Court’s Reasoning
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The court reasoned that Section 484-h was intended to prohibit more than what was already prohibited by Section 1141 of the Penal Law, which dealt with obscene materials. The key difference was the prohibition of material “which exploits, is devoted to, or deals principally in descriptions of illicit sex or sexual immorality,” regardless of whether it was obscene. The court noted the history of similar legislation that had been previously vetoed due to vagueness concerns following the Supreme Court’s decision in Winters v. New York, which struck down a law prohibiting the sale of material “principally made up of criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime.”
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The court emphasized that the statute lacked standards regarding the manner of presentation (e.g., whether salacious) or a requirement that the material incite immoral acts. This meant the statute could be construed to forbid a wide range of literature dealing with sensitive subjects, from classic Greek drama to modern fiction. “The Oedipus legend in classic Greek drama would be forbidden because it is principally devoted to incest, the Tristan and Isolde legend and Hawthorne’s ‘Scarlet Letter’ would be illicit reading for the young because it is principally made up of adultery, Bernard Shaw’s ‘Mrs. Warren’s Profession’ would be outlawed for obvious reasons, as well as all writings dealing with homosexuality.”
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The court acknowledged the possibility of variable obscenity standards for minors but noted that the legislature had not adopted such a standard. Instead, it enacted a statute that broadly prohibited material devoted to illicit sex or sexual immorality, regardless of its nature or intent. Because the statute was so broad and obscure, the court concluded that it unconstitutionally abridged freedom of speech and of the press and violated the due process clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. The court stated,