Mayer v. Temple Properties, 307 N.Y. 559 (1954): Liability for Dangerous Conditions to Child Trespassers

307 N.Y. 559 (1954)

A landowner can be liable for injuries to even a trespasser, including a child, if the injuries result from an affirmatively created, dangerous condition or trap on the property, especially when the landowner knows children frequent the area.

Summary

Frank Mayer, a 12-year-old boy, died after falling into an unguarded opening on a platform behind a building owned by Temple Properties and used in common with another defendant. The platform was accessible to children, who often played there, by crawling under a gate. The opening, normally covered by steel doors, was instead covered with flimsy wood that gave way when Mayer stepped on it. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the defendants created a dangerous trap and were liable for the boy’s death, despite his status as a trespasser. The court emphasized the affirmative act of creating a hazardous condition, the foreseeability of children’s presence, and the deceptive appearance of safety.

Facts

The platform, located behind defendants’ building in a congested neighborhood with many children, was accessible via a ladder and by crawling under a gate. The platform had a 4-foot-square opening used for raising and lowering ash and rubbish cans, normally covered by two hinged steel doors. Children frequently crawled under the gate and played on the platform, a practice known to the defendants’ agents, who occasionally chased them away. On the day of the accident, one steel door was open, and the opening was covered by “jerry-built” wood, described as being like orange crate or shipping crate material. Mayer and a friend crawled under the gate and onto the platform. When Mayer stepped on the wood covering the opening, it gave way, and he fell 55 feet to his death.

Procedural History

The plaintiff, Mayer’s father, sued the defendants for negligence. The case was tried before a Referee without a jury, who found in favor of the plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the defendants were liable for the death of the decedent, a trespasser, where the death resulted from a dangerous condition affirmatively created by the defendants on their property and where the defendants knew children frequented the area.

Holding

Yes, because the defendants affirmatively created a dangerous trap by covering the opening with flimsy wood, knew children frequented the area, and the insecure covering gave a deceptive appearance of safety.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized that while New York generally follows the rule that landowners owe trespassers only a duty to refrain from affirmative acts of negligence or intentional harm, this case fell within an exception. The court distinguished this case from those involving mere failure to repair or maintain property. Here, the defendants affirmatively created a dangerous condition by knowingly placing a frail wooden covering over a deep hole. The court noted, “Here we have abundant proof of affirmative action by defendants, who ‘changed conditions’ and ‘created new perils there’ by providing an insecure and deceptive covering over the platform opening.” The court also stressed that the defendants were aware that children frequently played on the platform, making the incident foreseeable. The court equated the situation to an “explosive bomb, highly inflammable material, a spring gun, or kindred devices,” stating that creating such a hazardous situation amounted to a “reckless disregard of the safety of human life.” The court distinguished Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Corp., 296 N.Y. 154 (1946), where the dangerous condition was a pre-existing condition far removed from public travel, and there was no affirmative act by the defendant. The Court held that the question of the decedent’s contributory negligence was a question of fact, and it was bound by the lower courts’ findings on that issue. Judges Dye and Van Voorhis dissented, arguing the defendants did not violate a duty owed to a trespasser, citing Carbone.