Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477 (1933)
r
r
A marriage may be annulled for fraud if one party, before the marriage, falsely represented their intention to fulfill the customary duties of marriage, including cohabitation, and then refused to do so after the marriage.
r
r
Summary
r
In this case, the plaintiff sought an annulment based on the defendant’s fraudulent premarital representation that he intended to cohabit with her and perform the customary duties of marriage. The trial court found that the defendant never intended to have sexual intercourse with the plaintiff and refused to do so, thus supporting a finding of fraudulent intent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the annulment, holding that a false statement of intent regarding a material aspect of marriage, such as cohabitation, constitutes fraud sufficient for annulment, provided there is satisfactory evidence beyond the plaintiff’s testimony.
r
r
Facts
r
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant fraudulently induced her to marry him by falsely representing that he would cohabit with her and fulfill the customary duties of marriage. After the marriage, the defendant refused to have sexual intercourse with the plaintiff. The plaintiff testified that the defendant’s refusal stemmed from a premarital fraudulent intent not to perform the marital act. The trial court believed the plaintiff’s testimony, which was supported by some circumstantial evidence. The defendant claimed to have had normal marital relations, which the plaintiff disputed.
r
r
Procedural History
r
The trial court granted a judgment of annulment in favor of the plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case then came before the New York Court of Appeals by leave of the Appellate Division.
r
r
Issue(s)
r
1. Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish each of the requisite elements of fraud necessary for an annulment under New York law.
r
2. Whether Section 1143 of the Civil Practice Act, requiring proof beyond the declaration or confession of a party, applies to contested annulment actions.
r
3. Whether the requirements of Section 1143 of the Civil Practice Act were satisfied by the evidence presented in this case.
r
r
Holding
r
1. Yes, because there was evidence of a premarital representation of intent to perform marital duties, falsity of that representation, and reliance by the plaintiff.
r
2. Yes, because Section 1143 applies to all annulment actions, not just default cases, requiring proof beyond the declarations or confessions of the parties.
r
3. Yes, because there was “other satisfactory evidence” beyond the plaintiff’s testimony and the defendant’s admissions, which, while not directly proving fraudulent intent, impugned the defendant’s truthfulness and provided additional support for the plaintiff’s claims.
r
r
Court’s Reasoning
r
The Court reasoned that to prove fraud, the plaintiff had to demonstrate a premarital representation by the defendant that he intended to perform the duties of marriage, that the representation was willfully false, and that the plaintiff relied on it. The court noted that entering into a marriage contract implies a promise of a normal marriage relationship. A false statement of intent is considered a statement of material fact. The court found that the falsity of the defendant’s representation could be inferred from his refusal to have sexual intercourse with the plaintiff. The Court addressed the applicability of Section 1143 of the Civil Practice Act, which requires proof beyond the declaration or confession of either party to the marriage. It determined that the statute applies to all annulment actions, not just default cases, to prevent collusion. The Court examined whether the